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ABSTRACT 
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Doctor of Clinical Psychology 
 
THINKING ABOUT THINKING: AN EXPLORATION OF METACOGNITIVE 
FACTORS IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF POSITIVE 
PSYCHOTIC SYMPTOMS 
By Catherine Louise Norman 
 
 
 
 
The literature review discusses the role of metacognition, defined as the cognitive 
processes involved in ‘thinking about thinking’, in the development and 
maintenance of persecutory delusions and auditory hallucinations. Much of the 
literature points to a strong role for metacognitive beliefs in the experience of both 
clinical and non-clinical levels of these symptoms and evidence is emerging too 
for the importance of metacognitive strategies, for example thought control, in the 
maintenance of persecutory delusions. Research to date however, has relied 
predominantly on non-causal correlational methodology to investigate the 
relationship between metacognition and psychosis. In addition, there is some 
difficulty in discerning the contribution of metacognition to persecutory delusions 
and auditory hallucinations specifically, owing to combined analysis or inclusion 
of delusions that are not persecutory or hallucinations that are not auditory. 
Overall, the findings of this review support the application of the Self- 
Regulatory Executive Model (S-REF) to the positive symptoms of psychosis and 
research strongly demonstrates the key role of affective processes in the 
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development and maintenance of clinical and non-clinical persecutory delusions 
and auditory hallucinations. 
The study aimed to explore the role of metacognitive strategies and 
metacognitive awareness in the maintenance of distress in non-clinical paranoia. 
A 2x2 between-subject experimental design (paranoia x condition) was employed. 
Seventy-three non-clinical staff and students participated in the study and were 
randomised to an experimental condition including an anxiety-inducing task or 
control condition. All participants completed measures of paranoia, anxiety, self- 
focus, metacognitive strategies and metacognitive awareness. 
Results demonstrated that participants with non-clinical paranoia 
experienced more paranoid cognitions, state and trait anxiety and used 
significantly more metacognitive strategies, including thought suppression. In 
addition, there was some evidence for lower metacognitive awareness in 
participants with high paranoia. These findings were not associated with 
condition. Future research and clinical implications in relation to the results are 
discussed. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
This review will outline current models of the positive symptoms of psychosis 
before synthesising research that investigates the role of metacognition in the 
development and maintenance of persecutory delusions and auditory hallucinations. 
Metacognition, which will be described fully shortly, is the application of cognition about 
cognition (Wells, 2009). It involves appraisals and beliefs about thoughts and strategies 
implicated in the control of thinking, including thought suppression. Metacognition is the 
focus of this review because it has already been identified as a key process in the 
development and maintenance of emotional disorders and other key cognitive processes 
underlying emotional disorders have previously been hypothesised to play an important 
role in the development and maintenance of psychosis. Research has logically shifted its 
focus to metacognitive processes in psychosis. The review will also address the 
limitations of Varese and Bentall’s review (2011) who investigated the role of 
metacognition in psychosis-related hallucinations. In addition, inclusion of both positive 
symptoms (delusions and auditory hallucinations) allows for a comparison of the role of 
metacognition. These are evident in other disorders, but will not be discussed here 
because this review focuses on hallucinations and delusions within a psychosis context. 
See Baethge et al. (2005) for a review of hallucinations in Bipolar disorder. 
To the author’s knowledge, no review has investigated the role of metacognition 
 
in persecutory delusions. Varese and Bentall (2011) investigated the relationship between 
cognitive intrusions and hallucination-proneness, and the role of metacognition in the 
maintenance of hallucinatory experiences. In brief, their review suggested that there is 
insufficient support for a unique contribution of metacognition in the association between 
intrusions and hallucinations. Instead, metacognitive beliefs may constitute a general 
vulnerability factor in both the development of emotional and psychotic disorders. 
 
 
3 METACOGNITION AND THE POSITIVE SYMPTOMS OF PSYCHOSIS 
 
 
Although this review highlighted the potential role of metacognition in hallucinations, it 
was limited by its reliance on the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ; Cartwright- 
Hatton & Wells, 1997) to identify relevant studies. This is a trait self-report measure of 
beliefs and processes associated with one’s thoughts. Descriptions of the measure’s 
subscales are reported in Appendix A. The authors restricted their search on this basis to 
make statistical comparisons in the meta-analysis. However, metacognition is broader in 
scope than metacognitive beliefs alone, limiting the inclusion of studies that investigated 
other metacognitive processes. 
Further reasons why this review focuses on persecutory delusions and auditory 
hallucinations are as follows: firstly these positive symptoms represent the hallmark of 
psychosis; they are the most common (Baker & Morrison, 1998), disabling and 
distressing psychotic symptoms seen clinically and frequently co-occur (Laroi & Van der 
Linden, 2005). They also dominate the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia in the 
Statistical Manual of Psychiatric Disorders Text Revision (DSM-IV TR; American 
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000). Secondly, the current psychological literature in 
psychosis is increasingly focused on symptoms rather than syndromes in order to 
understand the psychological processes involved in maintenance, and how to produce 
change. Thirdly, these symptoms have received the most attention in metacognitive 
research due to the parallels found with anxiety. 
Recent research suggests that psychosis may share the same underlying 
maintaining processes as anxiety (Clark, 1999; Freeman & Garety, 2003). For example, 
Freeman (2007) hypothesised that emotional reasoning and cognitive biases including 
jumping to conclusions maintain persecutory delusions. Earlier research by Moorey and 
Soni (1994) demonstrated significantly higher levels of anxiety in patients with 
schizophrenia than a non-clinical group highlighting an overlap between ‘neuroses and 
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psychosis’. This research suggests that anxiety and psychosis co-occur and may share 
underlying psychological processes. 
There has been a recent shift in the psychological conceptualisation of psychosis. 
The validity of the traditional diagnostic label of schizophrenia has been challenged and 
deemed an unhelpful way of understanding and treating psychosis (Bentall, 1990; 
Chadwick, 2006). There are two reasons for this shift; firstly the ‘syndrome’ approach 
suggests a stark difference between ill and well which is not supported by the literature. 
Secondly, a syndrome approach does not allow for idiosyncratic understanding, which is 
important given the heterogeneity of symptoms experienced (Morrison, Haddock & 
Tarrier, 1995). This helped to shift the focus of intervention to distress rather than 
symptoms, with metacognitive processes hypothesised to contribute to this distress 
(Garety & Hemsley, 1994). 
Metacognitive processes feature in two key cognitive-behavioural models that 
offer a psychological understanding of positive psychotic symptoms, (Garety, Kuipers, 
Fowler, Freeman & Bebbington, 2001; Morrison, 2001). Morrison (2001) characterises 
psychotic symptoms (for example a voice tells a father to hit his child) as ‘intrusions’. 
Psychological difficulties occur when this ‘intrusion’ is appraised as culturally- 
unacceptable (e.g. ‘the devil is telling me to harm my child’). Positive and negative 
metacognitive beliefs (e.g. ‘punishing myself will control my unwanted thoughts’) 
positively reinforce the interpretation of the ‘intrusion’ and lead to unhelpful cognitive 
and behavioural coping strategies such as drug-taking. Metacognitive beliefs can also be 
influenced by mood, including anxiety, which directly affects the meaning attributed to 
the anomalous experience. Garety et al. (2001) propose that specific cognitive processes 
lead to the formation and maintenance of positive symptoms. Negative metacognitive 
beliefs (for example about the uncontrollability of thoughts) increase distress associated 
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with the anomalous experience. Symptom-specific models will be discussed later in the 
review. 
While traditional cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) for psychosis focuses on 
misinterpretation and has proved effective at reducing comorbid symptoms including 
depression, outcomes linked directly to hallucinations and delusions are lacking and CBT 
has no clear benefit over other psychosocial interventions (Jones, Hacker, Cormac, 
Meaden & Irving, 2012). In addition, treatment often fails to significantly reduce the 
distress associated with positive symptoms (Mawson, Cohen & Berry, 2010). A narrow 
focus on understanding and altering the content of delusions (Freeman & Garety, 2000) 
and how this maintains psychosis may explain this. Arguably, other processes, such as the 
process of cognition (including metacognition), require targeting to improve patients’ 
quality of life. 
The continuum approach has broadened the scope of metacognitive-psychosis 
research beyond clinical populations. Epidemiological studies demonstrate that paranoia 
is widely experienced in the non-clinical population (Ellett, Lopes & Chadwick, 2003; 
Freeman et al., 2008a; Freeman et al., 2008b), with recent estimates suggesting that 
18.6% of the UK population experiences low-level suspiciousness (Freeman et al. 2011). 
Studies have found similar rates of delusions (17.5%) and hallucinations at a non-clinical 
level (van Os, Hanssen, Bijl & Ravelli, 2000; Varese, Barkus & Bentall, 2011). 
This supports the Paranoia Hierarchy (Freeman, 2007), which suggests that 
persecutory delusions are not dissimilar from beliefs experienced by the general 
population. It appears that experiencing paranoia or hallucinations is not sufficient to lead 
to distressing psychosis requiring mental health input. It is therefore important to 
understand the causes of distress. This may distinguish clinical from non-clinical 
populations (Freeman, 2007). 
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In summary metacognition, broadly termed ‘thinking about thinking’, is gaining 
much attention in the understanding of positive psychotic symptoms.  It is hypothesised 
that distress associated with delusions may be partially influenced by uncontrollability of 
thoughts about the beliefs held, rather than the content of the delusion itself (Freeman & 
Garety, 2004). As hallucinations and delusions are cognitive phenomena, it is important 
to examine cognitive processes, such as metacognition, that may play a part in the 
development and maintenance of associated distress. 
 
 
 
Definition of Terms 
 
 
 
 
Metacognition. Metacognition is defined as ‘knowledge and cognition about 
cognitive phenomena’ (Flavell, 1979, p. 906), focussing particularly on one’s own 
cognitive processes (Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 1997). Metacognitive 
research has been highly influential in the psychological conceptualisation of emotional 
disorders, most notably generalised anxiety disorder (GAD). Metacognitive processes 
(Wells & Carter, 2001), are hypothesised to explain why worry becomes chronic, leading 
to GAD. Wells (1995) elaborated on this definition, proposing that metacognition is 
characterised by metacognitive beliefs, which refer to the process of thinking or the 
content of thoughts. In GAD, individuals may hold the metacognitive belief that ‘worry is 
uncontrollable’ and an individual with auditory hallucinations may believe, ‘I can’t 
control these voices in my head’, ‘this means I am going mad’. The distress this provokes 
leads to maladaptive metacognitive strategies designed to control distress or their 
appraisals, namely thought suppression, rumination or thought control (Freeman & 
Garety, 2004). These metacognitive strategies prevent disconfirmation of negative beliefs 
and hence maintain anxiety and psychological disorder. 
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‘Intrusions’ in emotional disorders (for example in obsessive-compulsive 
disorder) activate beliefs about the significance of intrusions. The Self-Regulatory 
Executive Function model (S-REF) is a metacognitive model of psychological disorder 
(Wells, 2007; Wells & Matthews 1994). Research suggesting that anxiety and psychosis 
share underlying processes has sparked interest in its application to psychosis. The 
Cognitive Attentional Syndrome (CAS), a central feature of this model, represents a 
dysfunctional thinking style including worry and rumination which is responsible for 
psychological disorder. Maladaptive metacognitive coping strategies (for example 
thought control) lead to the CAS, increasing worry by maintaining the individual’s sense 
of threat (Wells, 2009). The CAS focuses attention on potential sources of threat and is 
controlled by beliefs about thinking (including positive and negative beliefs), which 
contribute towards the worry and ruminative thinking style. Wells (2007) suggests that 
these thinking styles are ignored by traditional cognitive theory in which core beliefs are 
paramount (Beck, 1976). Wells (2007) proposes that core beliefs are driven by 
metacognition and therefore altering the belief alone is insufficient for change. 
Much of metacognitive research focuses on maladaptive processes. An adaptive 
component outlined by Teasdale et al. (2002) is meta-awareness, which is the ability to 
view thoughts and feelings as ‘mental events rather than the self’ (Teasdale et al., 2002, p. 
275). How individuals relate to their thoughts determines whether thoughts are appraised 
as benign or threatening. Low meta-awareness has been implicated in vulnerability to 
depression (Teasdale et al., 2002). Meta-awareness has not to the author’s knowledge 
been investigated in psychosis research to date. 
 
Positive psychotic symptoms. There is general agreement that delusions are ‘a 
substantial break with reality’ (Bell, Halligan & Ellis, 2006). Freeman and Garety (2000, 
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2004) have attempted to define persecutory delusions to provide clarity to researchers 
investigating them.  Individuals experiencing persecutory delusions believe that a 
perpetrator intends to cause physical, social or psychological harm. Crucially, this causes 
distress to the ‘persecuted’ individual. Hallucinations are a distortion of perception (APA; 
DSM-IV-TR). Auditory hallucinations are defined as ‘audible thoughts, a discussion or 
argument about the patients or voices describing the patient’s ongoing activity’ (Morrison 
et al., 1995, p. 266). 
 
 
 
Method 
 
 
 
 
Databases PsycInfo, Web of Knowledge, Embase and Medline (PubMed) were 
used to identify literature for the present review. Only recent papers published in English 
with adult populations and with a primary focus on persecutory delusions or auditory 
hallucinations were included. The search terms used to identify literature were paranoia & 
metacognit*, persecutory delusions & metacognit*, hallucinat* & metacognit* and 
schizophreni* & metacognit*. The reference lists of chosen articles were also inspected to 
identify additional relevant papers. Only published literature was included. Non-clinical 
studies were included if they attempted to inform clinical psychosis research. A total of 
290 hits were returned and 35 articles were relevant. Figure 1 depicts the flow-chart of 
 
literature selection. 
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Number of original hits from searches 
using ‘Method’ search terms 
 
 
 
N = 290 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of papers deemed suitable for 
main body of literature review 
 
 
 
N = 35 (4 from reference list 
searches) 
Number of papers excluded 
 
 
 
 
N = 255 
 
  Duplicate (n =164) 
  Not measuring 
metacognition (n=39) 
  Metacognition but not 
focused on psychosis 
(n=19) e.g. OCD, 
Parkinson’s disease, 
borderline personality 
disorder 
  Focused on interventions 
(n=14) 
  Child/Adolescent focus 
(n=5) 
  Book (n=2) 
  Book review (n=2) 
  Conference paper (n=10) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Process of literature selection 
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Metacognition and Persecutory Delusions 
 
 
 
 
A model (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler & Bebbington, 2002) that influenced 
the psychological understanding and treatment of persecutory delusions, with its focus on 
cognitive maintenance factors, will be outlined before critiquing the literature examining 
metacognition and persecutory delusions. 
Freeman et al. (2002) propose that anxiety and depression contribute towards 
vulnerability to persecutory delusions. Anomalous (or unusual) experiences are 
interpreted as delusions by individuals who demonstrate a tendency to jump to 
conclusions, which limits the amount of information collected before coming to a 
conclusion. Pre-existing beliefs about the self (for example ‘I deserve harm’), others and 
the world increase the likelihood of a delusional interpretation. The choice of explanation 
for anomalous experiences is mediated by beliefs about mental illness, generated as a 
result of the occurrence of the anomalous experience. Freeman et al. (2002) suggest that 
beliefs about mental illness (e.g. ‘I’m going mad’) cause more distress than the belief that 
they are being persecuted. Therefore the least distressing explanation (persecution from 
an external source) is chosen to reduce cognitive-dissonance. 
Once this explanation is chosen, persecutory delusions are positively reinforced 
by the relief that comes with an external attribution. A bias towards collecting 
confirmatory evidence, (for example, ‘that man was staring menacingly at me’) and 
acting in a way consistent with the belief, (for example being constantly on-guard) also 
maintains the delusion. Anxiety is thought to lead to this sense of threat and is also a 
product of the appraisal of the paranoid thoughts
1. Will research support the existence of 
 
 
 
 
 
1  For example, anxiety may lead to the threat belief ‘that man is watching me’ and this might be appraised 
as ‘he wants to hurt me’, causing further anxiety. 
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negative metacognitive beliefs and anxiety in the development and maintenance of 
delusions? 
Six studies have examined the role of metacognition in persecutory delusions 
 
(Table 1). The majority of these studies draw on the S-REF model (Wells & Matthews, 
 
2004) and lend support for the role of metacognition in both the development and 
maintenance of persecutory delusions. Two studies (Freeman & Garety, 1999; Morrison 
& Wells, 2000) examined the use of thought control strategies
2  in patients with delusional 
 
beliefs. Freeman & Garety (1999) also explored the role of meta-worry (defined as worry 
about worry) in the maintenance of delusional beliefs. This study is discussed in detail as 
it is one of the first to provide support for the key role of anxiety in persecutory delusions 
at a comparable level to GAD. Metacognitive strategies were measured using the TCQ 
(Wells & Davies, 1994) and a purpose-designed questionnaire measured meta-worry. 
Seventy percent of participants with persecutory delusions and 86% of 
 
participants with GAD frequently reported uncontrollability of thoughts. Participants with 
GAD were more likely to report negative beliefs about worry (12/14) compared to 
participants with persecutory delusions (8/13). One quarter of each group reported 
positive beliefs about worry. Similar levels were also found for poor success at 
controlling worry. Despite the high levels of uncontrollability of thoughts, both clinical 
groups did not differ on either total or subscale TCQ score and were comparable to Wells 
and Davies’ (1994) control group, suggesting a ‘normal’ level of thought control in these 
clinical samples. Meta-worry also correlated highly with delusional distress, suggesting 
that meta-processes contribute to distress. Furthermore, trait anxiety strongly correlated 
with meta-worry and distress. This study demonstrates the need to investigate 
metacognitive processes in persecutory delusions, given comparable levels of meta-worry 
 
 
2  Thought control strategies are designed to manage unpleasant thoughts, for example, ‘I punish myself 
for thinking the thought’ (Wells & Davies, 1994). 
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found in these clinical groups. Results must be interpreted with caution; the use of an 
unvalidated measure, small sample and lack of control group mean that generalisation of 
findings is problematic. 
Other studies examined thought control strategies using the TCQ (Wells & 
Davies, 1994) with non-patient control groups rather than clinical groups. In line with 
Morrison and Wells’s (2000) hypothesis, patients used significantly more ‘worry
3’ and 
‘punishment
4’ strategies than non-patients, similar to the findings of Newman-Taylor, 
 
Graves and Stopa (2009) in a non-clinical population, and less ‘distraction’. Morrison and 
Wells (2000) concluded that low ‘distraction’ represents an indicator of positive mental 
health. Owing to the different comparison group, results contrasted to Freeman and 
Garety (1999). Morrison and Wells (2000) found preliminary support for use of more 
dysfunctional thought control strategies in psychosis. Although it is likely that the 
majority of patients held persecutory beliefs, the type of belief was not specified. In 
addition, half of the patient group also experienced auditory hallucinations, making the 
unique contribution of thought control strategies in delusional beliefs difficult to 
determine. 
Recent research has taken the investigation of metacognition a step further and 
explored the interaction between metacognition and psychological wellbeing among 
participants with persecutory delusions and major depression when compared to non- 
clinical participants (Valiente, Prados, Gomez & Fuentenebro, 2012). Although both 
clinical groups demonstrated elevated levels of dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs 
(MCQ-30; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) compared to the control group, participants 
with depression reported higher levels of ‘uncontrollability and danger’ and ‘lack of 
cognitive confidence’ than participants with persecutory delusions. Interestingly, 
 
 
3  A worry item is ‘I dwell on other worries’. 
4  A punishment item is ‘I tell myself not to be stupid’. 
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participants displaying frequent persecutory thinking and preoccupation with their own 
thoughts (‘cognitive self-consciousness) reported better wellbeing, suggesting that 
preoccupation with thoughts is viewed as a positive metacognitive factor. However, the 
exact relationship between wellbeing and metacognitive beliefs cannot be determined 
using a correlational design. Therefore, akin to GAD in which worrying is appraised as 
helpful, the presence of positive metacognitive beliefs associated with persecutory 
delusions may increase preoccupation with thoughts, which reinforces the delusion. This 
limits the ability or reduces the inclination to decentre (or step back) from thoughts with 
metacognitive awareness. 
Several of the studies discussed above have investigated positive beliefs about 
worry. While Valiente et al. (2012) and Freeman and Garety (1999) found no differences 
in reported levels of positive beliefs between patients with persecutory delusions, 
depression or GAD, the following research found differing results. 
Patients with persecutory delusions scored higher than patients with panic on the 
MCQ-65 subscale ‘positive beliefs about worry’
5  (Fraser, Morrison & Wells., 2006). 
There was also an association between the Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales 
(PSYRATS; Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier & Faragher, 1999) delusion ratings, ‘general 
negative beliefs’ (including items relating to suspicion and responsibility), beliefs about 
the ‘uncontrollability and danger of thoughts’ and ‘cognitive self-consciousness’. 
In addition, patients with delusions reported comparable levels of meta-worry 
(Anxious Thoughts Inventory [AnTI]; Morrison & Wells, 2007) to anxious patients. 
However, meta-worry did not significantly contribute to delusional distress, although 
social worry did, supporting the social-evaluative basis of paranoia (Freeman, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5  For example, worry helps to problem-solve. 
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Therefore, meta-worry and beliefs were related to delusions, but this study suggests that 
meta-worry does not predict delusional distress. 
Only one multi-site study examined metacognitive beliefs relating specifically to 
clinical paranoia (Morrison et al., 2011). The BaPS (Morrison et al., 2005) assesses 
metacognitive knowledge and has demonstrated good internal consistency (α=.89-.91) for 
the subscales (‘negative beliefs’ and ‘beliefs about paranoia as a survival strategy’), but 
poorer internal consistency for ‘positive beliefs’ and ‘normalising beliefs’. 
Although caution must be taken owing to poor internal consistency, positive 
beliefs about paranoia positively correlated with suspiciousness, which suggests that as 
suspiciousness increases, the value of remaining ‘paranoid’ is reinforced. Morrison et al. 
(2011) concluded that findings support the S-REF model; beliefs about cognitive 
processes contribute to the predisposition and maintenance of psychological difficulties. 
Patients endorsed more negative and positive beliefs about paranoia than non-patients. 
This builds on the findings of Freeman & Garety (1999), who found a positive association 
between delusional distress and meta-worry regarding control of delusional-related 
worries. However, the use of convenience sampling limits generalisation. 
Morrison et al. (2011) developed a metacognitive model of clinical paranoia to 
explain these findings. Positive beliefs about paranoia (for example, ‘my paranoia is a 
coping strategy’) are triggered by the onset of a stressful life event. These positive beliefs 
lead to specific paranoid thoughts that activate negative beliefs about paranoia. A 
catastrophic interpretation of this paranoia leads to distress and negative emotions and 
both behavioural and thought control strategies reinforce the paranoia. 
Overall, there is evidence for the presence of general metacognitive strategies in 
participants with persecutory delusions to a comparable degree to people with emotional 
disorders (Freeman & Garety, 1999) or elevated (Morrison & Wells, 2000).  General and 
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paranoia-specific metacognitive beliefs appear to have a reinforcing role in the paranoia 
experience (Morrison et al., 2011) and again are comparable to panic or depressed 
populations or elevated (Fraser et al., 2006; Valiente et al., 2012). In addition, anxiety, 
cited as key in the development of persecutory delusions (Freeman et al., 2002) 
contributes substantially to this relationship, correlating highly with meta-worry (Freeman 
 
& Garety, 1999), lending tentative support to the hypothesis that the appraisal of a threat 
belief leads to anxiety (Freeman et al., 2002). However, to date, meta-worry has not been 
shown to predict delusional distress. Individuals with persecutory delusions have been 
compared to a wide-range of clinical groups, including major depression and GAD, which 
might in part explain the mixed results. Furthermore, persecutory delusions have not been 
fully defined, with a wide-range of diagnoses included, making the unique contribution of 
metacognition in persecutory delusions difficult to determine. 
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Table 1 
 
Characteristics of included persecutory delusions papers 
 
Authors  Symptom studied  Design  Sample demographics  Instrument used to assess 
 
metacognition 
Main Findings 
 
Freeman  &  Garety  Persecutory delusions  Cross-sectional  - Patients with  TCQ  -Both groups experienced 
 
(1999)      persecutory delusions 
 
(n=15; 2 with DSM-IV 
  meta-worry, positive and 
 
negative beliefs about 
     
 
delusional disorder & 13   
 
worry and 
     
 
with DSM-IV Paranoid   
 
uncontrollability of 
     
 
Schizophrenia)   
 
thoughts. 
     
 
- Patients with DSM-IV     
     
 
GAD (n=14).     
 
 
Morrison & Wells 
 
 
DSM-IV Schizophrenia 
 
 
Cross-sectional 
 
 
-Patients with delusional 
 
 
TCQ 
 
 
- Patients with 
 
(2000) 
 
with delusional beliefs   
 
beliefs (n=22).   
 
schizophrenia used 
     
 
-Students and staff   
 
different strategies. 
     
 
(n=22).     
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Fraser, Morrison & 
 
Wells (2006) 
DSM-IV Delusional 
 
disorder or Schizophrenic 
Between-groups 
 
experimental design 
-Persecutory delusions 
 
(n=15). 
MCQ-65 
 
IUS 
-No significant difference 
 
between persecutory and 
 
 
spectrum disorder   
 
- Psychiatric control   
 
panic groups accept for 
 
 
experiencing persecutory   
 
group with Panic   
 
‘positive beliefs about 
 
 
delusions   
 
Disorder (n=15).   
 
worry’. 
     
 
-Non-clinical controls     
     
 
(n=15).     
 
 
Valiente, Prados, 
 
 
DSM-IV schizophrenia 
 
 
Cross-sectional 
 
 
-Patients with 
 
 
MCQ-30 
 
 
- Patients with depression 
 
Gomez & 
 
paranoia type;   
 
persecutory beliefs   
 
and persecutory beliefs 
 
Fuentenebro (2012) 
 
Schizophreniform disorder;   
 
(n=55).   
 
reported metacognitive 
 
 
schizoaffective disorder;   
 
- Patients with Major   
 
beliefs. 
 
 
delusional disorder; brief 
 
psychotic disorder; 
 
 
Depression (n=38). 
 
- Healthy control 
 
 
-No differences among 
 
groups on positive beliefs 
 
 
psychotic disorder not   
 
participants (n=44).   
 
about worry. 
 
 
specified.         
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Morrison et al.  Clinical Paranoia  Correlational  -Patients with  BaPS  -Stronger associations 
 
(2011) 
 
SCID for DSM-IV   
 
schizophrenia spectrum 
disorder (n=122). 
- Students (n=178). 
 
 
found between paranoia- 
related beliefs and clinical 
paranoia. 
 
 
 
 
 
Morrison & Wells 
 
(2007) 
DSM-IV Schizophrenia 
 
Spectrum disorder 
Correlational  - Patients with 
 
schizophrenia spectrum 
AnTI meta-worry 
 
subscale 
-Clinical groups 
 
demonstrated higher level 
 
 
(schizophrenia;   
 
disorder (n=51).   
 
of worry. 
 
 
Schizoaffective;   
 
-Anxiety disorder group     
 
 
schizophreniform disorder.   
 
with DSM-IV social     
 
 
phobia and panic 
 
disorder (n=40). 
   
 
- Non-clinical     
 
undergraduate students     
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(n=60). 
Note. TCQ = Thought Control Questionnaire; MCQ-65 = Metacognitions Questionnaire-65; MCQ-30 – Metacognitions Questionnaire-30; IUS = 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; BaPS = Beliefs about Paranoia Scale; AnTI = Anxious Thoughts Inventory; PSYRATS = Psychotic Symptoms Rating 
Scales 
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Metacognition and Non-Clinical Paranoia 
 
 
 
 
Studies of metacognition in non-clinical paranoia suggest anxiety is a key mediator 
between paranoia and metacognition, in line with Freeman et al. (2002) who suggest that 
anxiety is central in both the formation and maintenance of persecutory delusions. Studies are 
reported in Table 2. 
Two studies investigated thought control and thought suppression in non-clinical 
paranoia (Jones & Fernyhough, 2008; Newman-Taylor et al., 2009). Newman-Taylor et al. 
(2009) hypothesised that trait paranoia, measured using the Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & 
Vanable, 1992) would be positively associated with the thought control strategies 
‘punishment’ and ‘worry’ measured by the TCQ (Wells & Davies, 1994), since these 
strategies had already been implicated in persecutory delusions. 
As predicted, these strategies alongside ‘reappraisal
6’ correlated significantly with 
 
trait paranoia. However, regression analysis revealed that paranoia only uniquely predicted 
 
‘reappraisal’ and anxiety uniquely predicted both ‘punishment’ and ‘worry’. Without anxiety, 
the relationship between paranoia and thought control was weak. Anxiety may mediate the 
relationship between metacognition and paranoia; with anxiety increasing the likelihood of 
dwelling and self-punishing in the presence of paranoid thoughts, maintaining the sense of 
threat. 
Jones and Fernyhough (2008) were the first to investigate the relationship between 
thought suppression and non-clinical persecutory beliefs. They predicted that anxiety, central 
to the development (Freeman, 2007) and maintenance of persecutory delusions (Freeman et 
al., 2002) would moderate the relationship between thought suppression and persecutory-like 
beliefs. Thought suppression only predicted persecutory-like beliefs when anxiety was high, 
 
 
 
6  A ‘reappraisal’ item is ‘I focus on the thought and challenge it’ 
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implicating thought suppression in distress. Further, thought suppression and anxiety only 
predicted a relatively small amount of variance of persecutory beliefs. Therefore thought 
suppression is one of many contributing factors for persecutory-like beliefs. 
Of note is the variety of measures used to identify paranoia; the PS (Fenigstein & 
Vanable, 1992), Paranoia Checklist (PC; Freeman et al., 2005) and Persecutory Ideation 
Questionnaire (PIQ; McKay, Langdon & Coltheart, 2007). Whereas the PS, designed for a 
non-clinical population, consists mainly of lower-level paranoia items, the PC measures 
distress, frequency and conviction of items that are hypothesised to be more closely related to 
clinical paranoia. Similarly, to the PS the PIQ asks participants to endorse the ‘trueness’ of 
each item, but is designed for use with clinical and non-clinical populations. Therefore, the 
findings for thought control and suppression could be related to distress, frequency or simply 
endorsement of paranoid beliefs. 
While research exploring thought control strategies in non-clinical paranoia is limited, 
other research has used different methodology (for example controlling for the influence of 
anxiety) to explore  the role of metacognitive beliefs in the development of paranoid ideation 
(Garcia-Montes, Cangas, Perez-Alvarez, Hidalgo & Gutierrez, 2005; Palmier-Claus, Dunn, 
Morrison & Lewis, 2011). ‘Positive beliefs about worry’ and ‘lack of cognitive confidence’ 
correlated positively with paranoia (Garcia-Montes et al., 2005). However, when trait anxiety 
was controlled, only ‘lack of cognitive confidence’ remained a significant predictor of 
paranoid ideation. Therefore lack of trust in one’s own memory and poor attention may lead 
to the development of cognitive biases and metacognitive strategies including rumination. 
Here metacognition may contribute towards vulnerability, with findings that partially support 
its prediction of paranoid ideation. However the influence of anxiety found also by Newman- 
Taylor et al. (2009) bears heavily on findings. The investigation of thought control strategies 
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is not reported, potentially indicating a non-significant effect, which may have contrasted 
with the results of Newman-Taylor et al. (2009). 
Metacognitive beliefs as a vulnerability factor in predisposition to paranoia have also 
been investigated using an experimental design (Palmier-Claus et al., 2011). Seventy non- 
clinical participants were randomised to a neutral or stress-inducing condition. Interactions 
between stress and beliefs about controlling one’s thoughts and beliefs about the 
uncontrollability of thoughts and danger predicted negative affect. Main effects of negative 
affect across conditions were found for ‘lack of cognitive confidence’ and ‘uncontrollability 
and danger of thoughts’. Preoccupation with one’s own thoughts moderated the relationship 
between negative affect and suspiciousness, suggesting that cognitive self-consciousness is 
most closely related to paranoia.  Palmier-Claus et al.’s (2011) measure of negative affect 
included anxiety, however other emotions were also factors  including sadness and loneliness, 
making it difficult to add further evidence to a hypothesised relationship between anxiety, 
metacognition and paranoia. Studies that allow for path analyses may be useful in clarifying 
these relationships. 
The research investigating the role of metacognition in clinical and non-clinical 
paranoia suggests that metacognitive strategies and beliefs are shared by individuals across 
the continuum. However, what has not been investigated is a direct comparison between 
clinical and non-clinical paranoia groups to investigate whether individuals at the severe end 
of the spectrum demonstrate more conviction in metacognitive beliefs, more frequent use of 
thought control strategies and levels of anxiety to determine the metacognitive factors that 
may contribute to the transition from non-clinical to clinical levels of paranoia. 
Major flaws across these studies include the absence of power calculations to 
 
determine sample size, correlational designs, no clearly articulated hypotheses, failure to 
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control for  order effects (Garcia-Montes et al. 2005), and poor response rates, which may 
 
represent a selection bias (Newman-Taylor et al. 2009). 
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Table 2 
 
Characteristics of included non-clinical paranoia papers 
 
Authors  Symptom studied  Design  Sample demographics  Instrument used to 
 
assess metacognition 
Main findings 
Garcia-Montes,  Paranoia (PS)  Correlational  Non-clinical  MCQ-65  -Highlights the role of anxiety in 
 
Cangas, Perez-     
 
undergraduates 
 
TCQ 
 
the relationship between paranoia 
 
Alvarez, Hidalgo 
 
& Gutierrez (2005) 
   
 
(N=148).   
 
and metacognition. 
 
 
 
Newman-Taylor, 
 
 
 
Paranoia (PS, 
 
 
 
Correlational 
 
 
 
Non-clinical individuals 
 
 
 
TCQ 
 
 
 
- Anxiety is highlighted as a 
 
Graves & Stopa 
 
(2009) 
 
PCQ)   
 
(N=108).   
 
major contributing factor to the 
 
relationship between paranoia 
         
 
and anxiety. 
 
 
Palmier-Claus , 
 
 
Paranoia (PC) 
 
 
Cross-sectional 
 
 
Non-clinical 
 
 
MCQ-30 
 
 
-Metacognitive beliefs moderated 
 
Dunn, Morrison &     
 
undergraduates (N=70).   
 
the association between stress 
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Lewis (2011)          and negative affect and negative 
affect and suspicious thinking. 
 
 
Jones & 
Fernyhough (2008) 
 
 
Persecutory 
delusion-like 
beliefs (PIQ) 
 
 
Correlational 
 
 
Non-clinical 
undergraduates 
(N=183). 
 
 
WBSI 
 
 
- Only when anxiety levels were 
high did thought suppression 
have a significant effect on 
persecutory-like beliefs. 
Note. PS = Paranoia Scale; PCQ = Paranoid Cognitions Questionnaire; PC = The Paranoia Checklist; PIQ = Persecutory Ideation Questionnaire; MCQ-65 
 
= Metacognitions Questionnaire-65; TCQ = Thought Control Questionnaire; MCQ-30 = Metacognitions Questionnaire-30; WBSI = White Bear 
 
Suppression Inventory. 
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Metacognition and Clinical Auditory Hallucinations 
 
 
 
The following section will outline the contribution of metacognition to the 
development and maintenance of auditory hallucinations. Does it compare to the role that 
metacognition plays in persecutory delusions? Descriptions of studies are reported in Table 3. 
Morrison et al. (1995) developed the first comprehensive cognitive model of auditory 
hallucinations. Although there is consensus that hallucinations occur when internal cognitive 
events are misattributed to an external event, the causes of this misattribution are disputed. 
Morrison et al. (1995) suggest that the content of an auditory hallucination, similar to 
‘intrusive’ thoughts in OCD, is inconsistent with beliefs about the self and therefore is 
 
attributed externally. Cognitive-dissonance reinforces the hallucination (Morrison et al., 
 
1995). Crucially to this review, metacognitive beliefs regarding the controllability and 
acceptability of mental events are predicted to contribute towards a vulnerability to auditory 
hallucinations. Metacognitive beliefs are also hypothesised to be maintaining factors; the 
appraisal of the symptom, including metacognitive beliefs, leads to emotional and 
behavioural responses, which reinforce the intrusive thought. 
Morrison (1998) later emphasised parallels in the processes that maintain anxiety and 
psychosis, arguing that auditory hallucinations are fundamentally normal, becoming 
problematic when they are misinterpreted as threatening, much like bodily sensations in panic 
disorder, leading to negative emotions such as anxiety and physiological arousal. The 
perception of hallucinations as threatening may be explained by metacognitive beliefs about 
the uncontrollability and danger of the anomalous experience. This misinterpretation also 
leads to cognitive and behavioural safety-seeking behaviour which prevents disconfirmation 
of the perception of danger related to the hallucination, and increases their frequency. 
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The metacognitive conceptualisation of auditory hallucinations was taken a step 
further by the proposition that hallucinations are the direct product of metacognitions (Wells, 
2007). Metacognitive beliefs about the significance of hearing voices (thoughts) drive their 
appraisal and voices become distressing once strategies such as thought control are used. 
Therefore, altering the content of an auditory hallucination alone would be insufficient as it 
would not target metacognition. This implies that an exploration of metacognitive factors is 
warranted to ensure the underlying maintenance factors are fully understood. 
Morrison et al. (1995) predict that negative metacognitive beliefs are associated with 
emotional and behavioural responses to anomalous experiences. The model however does not 
implicate a role for metacognitive strategies, which may maintain auditory hallucinations. 
The contribution of metacognition to auditory hallucinations at a clinical level is 
difficult to clarify owing to the inclusion of a range of hallucinatory experiences and other 
psychotic symptoms in research studies, including persecutory delusions. Evidence overall 
suggests that negative beliefs about ‘uncontrollability and danger’ maintain auditory 
hallucinations (Baker & Morrison, 1998; Hill, Varese, Jackson & Linden., 2012; Perona- 
Garcelan et al., 2012). In addition, the following studies provide partial support to Morrison 
et al.’s (1995) prediction about the presence of negative metacognitive beliefs, but only Hill 
et al. (2012) investigated and found evidence for an association between general negative 
beliefs and distress. 
However, some research has not found this association (Garcia-Montes, Perez- 
Alvarez, Balbuena, Perona-Garcelan & Cangas., 2006a) due perhaps to the inclusion of visual 
hallucinations, and there is limited evidence for a role of positive metacognitive beliefs, (both 
general and voice-specific) in the development and maintenance of auditory hallucinations 
(Morrison et al., 2004).  Other metacognitive factors including experiential avoidance 
(Goldstone et al., 2012) are not implicated in the maintenance of auditory hallucinations. 
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One of the first studies to investigate the role of metacognition in psychosis aimed to 
clarify the cognitive processes implicated in the development and maintenance of auditory 
hallucinations (Baker & Morrison, 1998). Participants with current auditory hallucinations 
scored significantly higher than non-patients on all MCQ-65 (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 
1997) factors except ‘cognitive self-consciousness’ and scored significantly higher than both 
non-patients and the non-hallucinating psychotic group on ‘positive beliefs’ and ‘negative 
beliefs about uncontrollability and danger’. ‘Cognitive confidence’ and ‘general negative 
beliefs’ were also significantly more endorsed by both clinical groups compared to controls, 
suggesting the importance of metacognitive beliefs in psychosis as a whole. Only beliefs 
about ‘uncontrollability and danger’ significantly predicted auditory hallucinations. The level 
of delusions (type not specified) in both clinical groups were comparable, making the unique 
contribution of metacognition in auditory hallucinations easier to clarify. Akin to much of the 
persecutory delusions research, individuals who currently experience auditory hallucinations 
believe that worry must be controlled in order to remain safe. 
Subsequent studies have found differing results which may be explained by more 
robust study designs using several comparison groups and controlling for mediating effects of 
affect (Garcia-Montes et al., 2006a; Lobban, Haddock, Kinderman & Wells., 2002; Perona- 
Garcelan et al., 2012). Lobban et al. (2002) controlled anxiety and depression when 
comparing the role of metacognition in current voice-hearers, participants who had never 
heard voices, anxious participants and non-patient controls. A shortened and modified 
version of the MCQ (MCQ-SAM) was developed adding items assessing the consistency and 
voluntariness of thoughts. When anxiety and depression were controlled, hallucinating and 
anxious patients had significantly lower confidence in their cognitive processes than non- 
hallucinators and non-patient groups, and attributed higher importance to the consistency of 
thoughts.  This suggests that individuals with auditory hallucinations believe that thoughts 
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need to be consistent and that inconsistent thoughts are abnormal, which could explain their 
attribution as external. Interestingly, there were no group differences on the normality of 
having unwanted thoughts. Results differed from Baker and Morrison (1998). Although 
trends were present, no significant differences were found between groups on ‘positive 
beliefs about worry’ or ‘uncontrollability’ by Lobban et al. (2002) once affect was controlled. 
The MCQ-SAM demonstrated low internal consistency with the additional subscales, 
threatening its reliability as a measure of metacognition. 
The only small but significant predictor of auditory hallucinations found by Perona- 
Garcelan et al. (2012) was the need to control thoughts. In contrast to Lobban et al. (2002), 
the anxious group included participants with disorders in which dysfunctional metacognitions 
are a vulnerability and maintenance factor. Except ‘cognitive confidence’, patients with 
auditory hallucinations scored higher than the non-clinical group on metacognitive beliefs. 
They also scored higher than recovered patients on ‘uncontrollability and danger of 
thoughts’, which suggests that this metacognitive belief may be important in the maintenance 
of auditory hallucinations, rather than a general vulnerability factor. Crucially, differences 
were lost when current hallucinators were compared with patients with current delusions. 
Like many studies already discussed, the current auditory hallucinations group also included 
participants with delusional symptoms. In addition, Perona-Garcelan et al. (2012) failed to 
report differences between the hallucinating and anxious groups, suggesting a bias in 
reporting of results. 
Members of the same research group (Garcia-Montes et al., 2006a) included similar 
control groups, with the addition of an OCD group. Hypotheses were based upon Morrison et 
al. (1995) and the comparison between intrusive thoughts in anxiety and auditory 
hallucinations and given this, predicted that psychotic patients with auditory hallucinations 
would demonstrate similar metacognitive beliefs to patients with OCD. Apart from the 
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‘never’ hallucinated and ‘recovered’ hallucinators, the non-clinical control group scored lower 
than other clinical groups on ‘uncontrollability and danger’, providing evidence for the role of 
metacognitive processes in both hallucinations and anxiety. Furthermore, current hallucinators 
and patients with OCD demonstrated similar levels of ‘general negative beliefs’, which is 
unsurprising given the strong role of responsibility in the maintenance of OCD. Endorsement 
of ‘cognitive self-consciousness’ was comparable between these groups and the clinical 
control group. Garcia-Montes et al., (2006a) highlighted similar patterns of preoccupation 
with thoughts and of attaching significance to negative thoughts among hallucinating and 
anxious groups. 
Metacognitive beliefs did not predict predisposition to hallucinations. However, 
 
‘general negative beliefs’ was near significance for the current hallucinators and 
 
‘uncontrollability and danger’ was near significance for the ‘never’ hallucinated group, 
differing from the findings of Baker and Morrison (1998). The inclusion of anxious 
participants could not have impacted on this finding, since the clinical groups were analysed 
separately, suggesting that without anxiety the relationship between metacognition and 
hallucinations is weakened. In addition, hallucination-type was not distinguished and the 
sample may have included other hallucination types. 
Recent research has addressed the role of metacognitive beliefs in the development of 
distress associated with auditory hallucinations (Hill et al., 2012). Clinical voice-hearers 
scored significantly higher than both control groups on negative beliefs about worry and 
negative beliefs about the need for control. The two control groups did not differ on 
metacognitive beliefs, which suggests metacognitive beliefs are not associated with non- 
clinical voice-hearing. Voice-hearer distress was related to ‘uncontrollability and danger’ of 
thoughts and ‘lack of cognitive confidence’ and statistically-significant associations were 
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found between anxiety and all metacognitive beliefs other than ‘cognitive-self- 
 
consciousness’. 
 
Despite these initial findings, only ‘general negative beliefs’ relating to a need for 
control remained a significant predictor of distress once anxiety was controlled.  Distress was 
predicted only by group (voice-hearers) once added to the regression. The research of Hill et 
al. (2012) suggests that beliefs about needing to control worry are associated with the 
presence of anxiety and distress, not the hallucination itself, supporting the S-REF model of 
psychopathology. The major flaw is the inclusion of people with disorders other than 
psychosis, including borderline personality disorder and bipolar disorder, although the 
majority of voice-hearers had a diagnosis of schizophrenia. 
Recent research (Goldstone, Farhall and Ong, 2012) has explored the contribution of 
metacognitive factors other than beliefs, namely experiential avoidance. Experiential 
avoidance is defined as an unwillingness to ‘remain in contact with particular private 
experiences’ (Hayes et al., 2004, p.554) including thoughts and bodily sensations. Individuals 
attempt as a consequence to change these inner events through processes such as thought 
suppression. Experiential avoidance is a metacognitive strategy as it is an attempt to mentally 
avoid these inner experiences. 
The AAQ-II
7  (Bond et al., 2011) measures experiential avoidance; specifically 
 
psychological inflexibility and acceptance of internal events
8. This has been linked to 
psychological distress (Goldstone et al., 2012), who investigated vulnerability pathways to 
the development of hallucinations in both non-clinical and clinical populations. The clinical 
group experienced higher levels of dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs and demonstrated less 
psychological flexibility than non-clinical participants. Predictors of hallucinations differed 
between groups; with childhood trauma and life hassles best predicting auditory 
 
 
7  An example item of the AAQ-II: ‘I worry about not being able to control my worries and feelings’. 
8  For example, negative evaluations of unwanted thoughts, feelings and sensations. 
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hallucinations in the non-clinical group. This relationship was partially mediated by 
metacognitive beliefs. In the clinical group, childhood sexual trauma and experiential 
avoidance were the best predictors of hallucinations in general, but no factors predicted 
auditory hallucinations. The predictive power of metacognition was therefore not 
demonstrated in this sample. 
Goldstone et al. (2012) highlight the importance of exploring other metacognitive 
processes that may be involved in the formation of clinical hallucinations. Auditory 
hallucinations may be negatively reinforced by the short relief provided by experiential 
avoidance. However, the clinical group effects were confounded by comorbid anxiety 
disorders (37%), depression (44%) and substance abuse (39%). In addition, mean levels of 
auditory hallucinations were low (see Table 3). 
Morrison, Nothard, Bowe and Wells., (2004) explored specific interpretations of 
voices using the Interpretation of Voices Inventory
9  (IVI, Morrison et al., 2002a). Frequency 
of positive beliefs did not differ between voice-hearers and non-patients, which suggests that 
positive beliefs are stable across the continuum of hallucinatory experience, whereas negative 
beliefs about loss of control and metaphysical beliefs were higher in the clinical group. 
Perhaps beliefs about loss of control are associated with feelings of helplessness, which may 
cause distress. This may contribute towards the transition from non-clinical to clinical levels 
of hallucinations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9  The IVI has three subscales; metaphysical beliefs, positive beliefs and beliefs about loss of control. All three 
subscales have demonstrated good internal consistency; .94, .80 and .88 respectively. 
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Table 3 
 
Characteristics of clinical auditory hallucinations papers 
 
Authors  Symptom studied  Design  Sample demographics  Instrument used to assess 
 
metacognition 
Main findings 
Baker &  DSM-IV for  Correlational  - Auditory hallucination  MCQ-65  -The only significant predictor for 
 
Morrison 
 
Schizophrenia (KGV- 
 
and cross- 
 
group (n=15)   
 
auditory hallucinations alone was negative 
 
(1998) 
 
R) 
 
sectional 
 
- Non-hallucinating clinical 
 
group (n=15) 
 
 
beliefs about uncontrollability 
     
 
- Non-psychiatric control     
     
 
group (n=15).     
 
 
Lobban, 
 
 
DSM-IV 
 
 
Cross- 
 
 
- Current auditory 
 
 
MCQ-SAM 
 
 
- Hallucinating and non-hallucinating 
 
Haddock, 
 
Schizophrenia 
 
sectional 
 
hallucination group (n=32).   
 
patients scored significantly higher than 
 
Kinderman 
 
KGV Symptom Scale   
 
- Psychotic group with no   
 
both other groups on beliefs about 
 
& Wells     
 
auditory hallucinations   
 
consistency of thoughts. 
 
(2002)     
 
(n=23).     
     
 
- Anxiety group (n=24).     
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  - Non-patient control group 
 
(n=28). 
 
 
 
Garcia- 
 
 
DSM-IV-TR 
 
 
Correlational 
 
 
- Current hallucinators 
 
 
MCQ-65 
 
 
- No metacognitive factors significantly 
 
Montes, 
 
Schizophrenia   
 
(n=21)   
 
predicted predisposition to hallucinations. 
 
Perez- 
 
LSHS   
 
- Schizophrenia without     
 
Alvarez,     
 
hallucinations (n=22)     
 
Balbuena, 
 
Garcelan 
   
 
- Recovered hallucinators 
 
(n=16) with Schizophrenia. 
   
 
& Cangas     
 
- Patients with OCD (n=23)     
 
(2006a)     
 
without psychotic     
 
 
symptoms.     
 
- Clinical control group 
 
with a wide variety of 
   
 
diagnoses (n=26)     
 
- Non-clinical control     
 
(n=20).     
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Goldstone, 
Farhall & 
Ong 
Hallucinations - 
Psychotic disorder 
LSHS-R 
Correlational  - Clinical sample (n=100) 
mean score on LSHS-R for 
auditory hallucinations = 
MCQ-30 
 
AAQ-II 
- Predictors of vulnerability to 
hallucinations varied between the clinical 
and non-clinical groups. 
 
(2012)     
 
5.34 (SD = 3.91).     
     
 
- Non-clinical     
     
 
undergraduate students     
     
 
(n=133). Mean score on     
     
 
LSHS-R for auditory     
     
 
hallucinations = 1.24 (SD = 
 
1.76). 
   
 
 
Perona- 
 
 
Auditory 
 
 
Correlational 
 
 
- Patients with auditory 
 
 
MCQ-30 
 
 
- ‘General negative beliefs’ had the most 
 
Garcelan 
 
hallucinations 
 
and cross- 
 
hallucinations (n=27)   
 
predictive power for hallucinations. 
 
et al. 
 
(2012) 
 
DSM-IV-TR 
 
Schizophrenia 
 
sectional 
 
- Patients with delusions & 
 
no hallucinations (n=20). 
   
 
 
PANSS   
 
- Recovered from positive     
     
 
symptoms (n=28).     
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  - Clinical control (n=22). 
 
- Non-clinical control 
 
(n=27). 
 
 
 
Morrison, 
 
 
DSM-IV 
 
 
Cross- 
 
 
- Voice-Hearer group 
 
 
IVI 
 
 
- Interpretations of loss of control and 
 
Nothard, 
 
Schizophrenia 
 
sectional 
 
(n=41)   
 
metaphysical beliefs about voices were 
 
Bowe & 
 
spectrum disorder   
 
- Non-clinical staff and   
 
significantly different between groups. 
 
Wells 
 
(2004) 
   
 
students (n=39).     
 
 
Hill, 
 
 
Psychotic disorder 
 
 
Cross- 
 
 
- Clinical voice-hearer 
 
 
MCQ-30 
 
 
-‘General negative beliefs’ was the only 
 
Varese,   
 
sectional 
 
group (n=20). 
 
PANSS anxiety 
 
significant predictor of voice-hearer 
 
Jackson & 
 
Linden 
   
 
-Non-clinical voice-hearers 
 
(n=20). 
 
PSYRATS distress 
 
distress. 
 
(2012)     
 
-Non-clinical control group     
     
 
(n=20).     
Note. KGV-R = Structured Clinical Interview of affect, positive and negative psychosis symptoms; LSHS-R = Launay-Slade Hallucinations Scale-Revised; 
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MCQ-65 = Metacognitions Questionniare-65; MCQ-30 = Metacognitions Questionnaire-30; MCQ-SAM = Metacognitions questionnaire-shortened and 
 
modified; LSHS = Launay-Slade Hallucinations Scale; AAQ-II = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire II; PANSS = Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. 
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Metacognition and Non-clinical Hallucinations 
 
 
 
 
In addition to clinical populations, research has examined the cognitive factors that 
may feature in predisposition to non-clinical hallucinations (Table 4). Morrison, Wells & 
Nothard (2000) hypothesised that predisposition to hallucinations using the Revised 
Hallucination Scale (RHS; Morrison et al., 2000) would be associated with positive beliefs 
about hallucinations, independent of anxiety and paranoia . Furthermore, individuals highly 
predisposed to hallucinations would endorse different metacognitive beliefs and use different 
thought control strategies compared with individuals low in predisposition. Hypotheses were 
proven correct, with positive beliefs about unusual perceptual experiences, as measured by a 
visual analogue scale proving the best predictor of auditory hallucinations. Negative beliefs 
about unusual perceptual experiences and paranoia were not significant predictors. This 
suggests that positive beliefs predispose individuals to engage initially with their 
hallucinations at a non-clinical level. This fits with research that indicates limited support for 
the role of positive beliefs in clinical hallucinations. The finding that paranoia was not a 
significant predictor of auditory hallucinations may suggest that at a non-clinical level, these 
anomalous experiences may not co-exist or function differently. 
In addition, individuals highly predisposed to hallucinations were more likely to use 
the thought control strategies ‘punishment’ and ‘reappraisal’ and endorse the metacognitive 
beliefs ‘cognitive self-consciousness’, ‘uncontrollability and danger’ and ‘general negative 
beliefs’ (Morrison et al., 2000). At this level of analysis, ‘positive beliefs about worry’ were 
non-significant. This lends support for the role of metacognition in predisposition to 
hallucinatory experiences, with positive beliefs specific to anomalous experiences found to be 
the best predictor and some negative metacognitive beliefs found to be more endorsed by 
individuals highly predisposed. This may suggest that positive beliefs ‘hook’ individuals into 
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engaging with their experiences, and negative metacognitive beliefs may be more associated 
with distress or when experiences become threatening, prompting the use of ‘punishment’ 
and ‘reappraisal’. However, general metacognitive beliefs were not entered into the multiple 
regression hence their role is unknown. 
Similarly, negative beliefs about ‘uncontrollability and danger’ as well as ‘lack of 
cognitive confidence’ have positively correlated with predisposition to auditory 
hallucinations (Morrison & Petersen, 2003). This relationship was also found for visual 
hallucinations. Although metacognitive beliefs explained a significant amount of the variance 
for predisposition to auditory and visual hallucinations, bereavement and emotional abuse 
were also significant predictors. This suggests that both internal cognitive and external events 
contribute to the development and/or maintenance of anomalous experiences, as predicted by 
the models of Morrison et al. (1995) and general models of the positive symptoms of 
psychosis (Garety et al., 2001; Morrison, 2001). A combination of these internal and external 
events may contribute towards the predisposition to hallucinatory experiences. Baker and 
Morrison (1998) found similar results. 
The finding that positive beliefs best predict predisposition to hallucinations was built 
upon using the Interpretation of Voices Inventory (IVI; Morrison et al., 2002a). Morrison et 
al. (2002a) hypothesised that positive interpretations of voices would predict frequency of 
hallucinatory experiences; because voices are more likely to be engaged with if they are 
appraised as benevolent. Akin to Morrison et al. (2000), positive beliefs about voices were 
significantly associated with predisposition to auditory hallucinations (Morrison et al., 2002a) 
and together with positive beliefs about thoughts and trait anxiety, accounted for most of the 
variance. Although negative interpretations of voices were associated with assessing how 
much voices were troublesome, neither these nor negative metacognitive beliefs contributed 
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to the predisposition to hallucinations, which answers the limitation of Morrison et al. 2000 
who did not enter general negative metacognitive beliefs into the multiple regression. 
Although this study supports the role of positive beliefs and interpretations in 
predisposition to hallucinations, the role of negative beliefs and interpretations remains 
unclear. Morrison et al. (2002a) only included two negative belief subscales including beliefs 
about ‘uncontrollability’ and ‘general negative beliefs’. Correlations between the IVI 
(Morrison et al., 2002a) and Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters, Joseph & Garety, 
1999) were all significant other than predisposition to auditory hallucinations, which may 
suggest that the IVI (Morrison et al., 2002a) has insufficient sensitivity to identify factors that 
may associate with auditory hallucinations, despite good overall psychometric properties. 
This also points to the contribution of anxiety, similarly to that found in paranoia research. 
 
Laroi, Van der Linden and Marczewski (2004) found significant differences between 
non-clinical hallucination-prone participants and non-hallucination prone participants on all 
subscales of a French MCQ, which comprised 64 rather than 65 items (Laroi et al., 2004)
10. 
In addition, hallucination-prone participants were more likely to externalise negative self- 
generated items following a reality monitoring task
11, lending support to cognitive- 
dissonance and externalisation of negative thoughts in the development of hallucinations 
(Morrison et al., 1995). Metacognition may also play a role in this process. The theory that 
positive beliefs engage individuals in hallucinatory experiences contradicts the findings of 
Laroi et al. (2004). Despite participants with hallucinations endorsing positive metacognitive 
beliefs, they externalised self-generated negative information, suggesting that positive beliefs 
 
are not implicated in the search for an external explanation. Perhaps positive beliefs are 
 
 
 
10 The French version of the MCQ is reported to have adequate psychometric properties compared to the 
original scale (Laroi et al., 2004). 
11 The task involved eliciting the first word that came to mind when presented with a list of positive and 
negative words. After a delay, participants were presented with new words, words presented by the 
experimenter and words generated by participants and were asked to identify whether each word was old or 
new and to identify the source. 
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implicated when the hallucinatory experience is benevolent or seen as positive, akin to 
Morrison et al. (2000). This research suggests that the content of hallucinations and 
metacognitive factors interact to create either a positive or negative appraisal of 
hallucinations and subsequent reactions to the experience. However, this study’s analysis 
combined visual and auditory hallucinations (Laroi et al., 2004). 
Although several of the above studies found an association between hallucination- 
proneness and ‘uncontrollability and danger’ of thoughts among other metacognitive beliefs 
(Morrison et al. 2000; Morrison & Petersen, 2003; Laroi et al., 2004), one study found that 
this subscale alone predicted predisposition to auditory hallucinations (Cangas, Errasti, 
Garcia-Montes, Alvarez & Ruiz, 2006) following completion of a set of questionnaires and a 
laboratory test of attention
12. However, level of unwanted intrusions, which may impact upon 
 
the use of metacognitive strategies, was not controlled for. This was addressed in another 
study (Jones & Fernyhough, 2006). 
When intrusion items of the WBSI (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) were extracted and 
controlled for, ‘positive beliefs about worry’ and ‘general negative beliefs’ were no longer 
significant predictors of hallucination-proneness (Jones & Fernyhough, 2006) suggesting that 
these maladaptive metacognitive beliefs relate to intrusive thinking. Since both thought 
suppression and intrusive thoughts also correlated with hallucination-proneness, higher 
proneness to hallucinations may increase the likelihood of thought suppression. The authors 
offer a revised model of auditory hallucinations. Thought suppression (among other factors) 
produces unwanted intrusive thought and this forms the basis of an auditory hallucination. 
They argue that it is mostly the degree of awareness and attention to these intrusive thoughts 
(‘cognitive self-consciousness’) that determines their misinterpretation as auditory 
hallucinations. To date however, there is insufficient evidence to support this revised model. 
 
 
12 The test of attention was an adaptation of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Fey, 1952) assessing attention 
and perseveration following rule changes. 
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While positive correlations were also found between all MCQ-30 subscales and 
hallucination-proneness, the role of thought suppression was also investigated. The strongest 
predictor of auditory hallucination-proneness was ‘cognitive self-consciousness’, contrasting 
to clinical hallucination findings (Garcia-Montes et al., 2006a; Hill et al., 2012). These 
individuals may experience cognitive-dissonance and therefore make external attributions for 
their anomalous experiences as a result. 
Unlike Morrison et al.’s (1995) assertion, positive beliefs did not significantly 
contribute towards an understanding of this phenomenon when intrusion items were 
controlled for, suggesting again that the role of positive beliefs may be dependent on voice 
content, with malevolent content associated with negative metacognitive beliefs. This is in 
line with research suggesting that the type of relationship with voices determines the beliefs 
generated about voices and subsequent affective and behavioural responses (Chadwick & 
Birchwood, 1994) 
More recently, studies have demonstrated the importance of controlling for the effects 
of anxiety and paranoia in order to clarify the unique contribution of metacognition to 
hallucination-proneness (Garcia-Montes, Cangas, Perez-Alvarez, Fidalgo & Gutierrez, 
2006b; Varese et al., 2011). 
 
Garcia-Montes et al. (2006b) predicted that when anxiety was controlled for (STAI, 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & Jacobs, 1983) individuals with a predisposition to 
hallucinations (measured using the RHS; Morrison et al., 2000) would still demonstrate more 
metacognitive beliefs (MCQ-65) and thought control strategies than those with a weak 
disposition (Garcia-Montes et al., 2006b). Results indicated a unique contribution, 
independent of anxiety, of the metacognitive variable ‘lack of cognitive confidence’ and the 
thought control strategy ‘worry’ in the vulnerability to visual and auditory hallucinations. 
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The finding that ‘lack of cognitive confidence’ underlies hallucination-proneness is 
partially supported by the findings of Jones and Fernyhough (2006), who, without controlling 
for anxiety, found this metacognitive variable to be a predictor. However, only trait anxiety 
was controlled for and like several studies discussed, order effects of questionnaires were not 
controlled for in such a large sample. Research may find differing results if the impact of 
state anxiety is examined in relation to metacognitive variables. State anxiety may be more 
closely related to distress, mirroring processes that may occur in individuals with psychosis. 
Confounding variables including intrusive, distressing thoughts (Distressing Thoughts 
Questionnaire [DTQ]; Clark & deSilva, 1985) and deservedness of persecution (Persecution 
and Deservedness Scale
13  [PDS]; Melo, Corcoran, Shryane & Bentall, 2009) have been 
controlled for when attempting to clarify the unique relationship between metacognitive 
beliefs and hallucination-proneness (Varese et al., 2011). Hallucination-proneness was 
significantly associated with cognitive intrusions and paranoia; however, when hallucination- 
proneness was controlled for, paranoid ideation had a stronger relationship with cognitive 
intrusions. This suggests that paranoia has a stronger relationship with depressive and 
anxious cognitions than hallucination-proneness. This is not surprising, since the DTQ (Clark 
 
& deSilva, 1985) measures a wide-range of cognitions, for example worry about health, 
which would logically associated more closely with paranoia and anxiety disorders including 
GAD than hallucination-proneness. Metacognitive beliefs only accounted for 2% more of the 
variance on the LSHS-R (Bentall & Slade, 1985) beyond other factors including paranoia and 
cognitive intrusions. Only ‘cognitive self-consciousness’ akin to Jones and Fernyhough 
(2006) significantly contributed towards hallucination-proneness when other variables were 
controlled. 
 
 
 
 
13 The frequency subscale of the DTQ was used to assess cognitive intrusions with depressive and anxious 
content. Intrusive thoughts include items including ‘Thoughts or images that my future is bleak’ and 
respondents rate how often they experiences these thoughts. 
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Interestingly, when the Five Factors Mindfulness Questionnaire
14 (FFMQ, Baer, 
Smith, Hopkins, Krietmeyer & Toney, 2006) was entered into the regression this association 
was lost. This suggests the presence of a strong relationship between hallucination-proneness 
and acting without awareness. Hallucination-proneness may be related to the metacognitive 
process of monitoring and controlling of mental events. 
The exploration of hallucination-proneness and metacognitive beliefs has broadened 
to include Schizotypy
15 (Stirling, Barkus & Lewis, 2007). A modified version of the MCQ, 
named the ‘MCQ-th’, was used alongside the original
16. Stirling et al. (2007) hypothesised 
that hallucination-proneness may not be associated with positive beliefs about worry 
(Morrison et al., 2000) because those highly prone to hallucinations would have beliefs 
relating to worry. The high hallucination-prone group scored higher on all metacognitive 
beliefs other than ‘positive beliefs about worry’, in-line with hypotheses. This group also 
scored higher on three of the four MCQ-th factors; (1) ‘awareness and usefulness of 
controlling for thoughts’, (2) ‘uncontrollability and danger attendant to thinking’ and (3) 
‘negative beliefs about the consequences of thinking’ other than ‘lacking confidence in own 
 
cognition’. 
 
Schizotypy also correlated with all MCQ and MCQ-th factors. The best predictors of 
Schizotypy were ‘uncontrollability and danger of thoughts’ and ‘negative beliefs about 
thoughts in general’, accounting for 42% of the variance. When the MCQ-th factors were 
entered into a stepwise multiple regression with Schizotypy, the two best metacognitive 
predictors accounted for 47% of the variance. Only 84 of 106 participants completed all 
elements of the study and there were overlaps between the factor structure of the MCQ and 
MCQ-th; the latter of which requires validating. These findings are comparable to Morrison 
 
 
 
14 An example item is ‘I find it difficult to stay focussed on what’s happening in the present’ 
15 A continuum of personality characteristics and experiences ranging from normal dissociative states and 
psychosis 
16 Items relating to ‘worry’ were replaced by ‘thinking about or reflecting on thoughts’. 
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et al. (2000), Baker and Morrison (1998) and Morrison and Wells (2003) in clinical 
populations. 
To some degree, metacognition plays a role in the development and maintenance of 
auditory hallucinations in non-clinical samples. There is particularly strong evidence for the 
role of beliefs about the ‘uncontrollability and danger of thoughts’ and ‘cognitive 
confidence’. However, this apparent relationship is weakened once anxiety or paranoia are 
considered. The inclusion of visual and auditory hallucinations in the majority of these 
studies demonstrates that metacognition may play a role in both anomalous experiences and 
contributes towards vulnerability to psychopathology, as hypothesised by the S-REF model 
(Wells & Matthews, 1994). The contribution of metacognitive strategies, including thought 
control, has been paid relatively little attention, but strategies including ‘punishment’ and ‘re- 
 
appraisal’ appear implicated in the maintenance of auditory hallucinations. 
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Table 4 
 
Characteristics of non-clinical hallucination papers 
 
Author  Symptom studied  Design  Sample 
 
characteristics 
Instruments used to 
 
assess 
metacognition 
Main findings 
Morrison, Wells  Auditory & visual  Within-participant  Non-clinical  MCQ-65  -Positive beliefs about unusual experiences 
 
& Nothard 
 
(2000) 
 
hallucination- 
 
proneness 
 
Correlational 
 
undergraduate 
 
students/health 
 
TCQ 
 
were the best predictor of predisposition to 
 
auditory and visual hallucinations. 
 
 
(RHS)   
 
professionals     
     
 
(N=105).     
 
 
Morrison, Wells 
 
 
Auditory 
 
 
Within participant 
 
 
Non-clinical health 
 
 
3 subscales of 
 
 
-Beliefs about voices were significantly 
 
& Nothard 
 
hallucination 
 
correlational 
 
service staff 
 
MCQ-65 
 
associated with predisposition to auditory 
 
(2002) 
 
proneness (RHS)   
 
(N=132). 
 
IVI 
 
hallucinations and how troublesome voices 
         
 
were. 
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Varese, Barkus 
 
& Bentall (2011) 
Hallucination- 
proneness (LSHS-R) 
Correlational  -Non-clinical 
students screened 
(N=1,388). 
MCQ-30 
 
FFMQ 
-Metacognitive beliefs were more strongly 
associated with intrusions and paranoia than 
hallucination-proneness. 
     
 
-Hallucination-prone     
     
 
individuals (n=67).     
 
 
Laroi, Van der 
 
 
Hallucination- 
 
 
Between-subject 
 
 
- Non-clinical 
 
 
MCQ-64 
 
 
-There was a significant difference between 
 
Linden & 
 
proneness (LSHS) 
 
group design 
 
hallucination-prone   
 
groups on all factors of the MCQ and 
 
Marczewski 
 
(2004) 
   
 
undergraduate 
 
students (n=25). 
 
 
significant correlations between LSHS and 
 
MCQ scores. 
     
 
- Non-clinical non-     
     
 
hallucination-prone     
     
 
undergraduate     
     
 
students (n=25).     
 
 
Cangas, Errasti, 
 
 
Hallucination- 
 
 
Correlational 
 
 
Non-clinical 
 
 
MCQ-65 
 
 
- Beliefs about ‘uncontrollability and danger’ 
 
Garcia-Montes, 
 
proneness (RHS)   
 
psychology students   
 
explained a large part of the variance in 
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Alvarez & Ruiz 
 
(2006) 
    (N=81).    predisposition to auditory hallucinations. 
 
 
Garcia-montes, 
 
 
Hallucination- 
 
 
Correlational 
 
 
Non-clinical 
 
 
TCQ 
 
 
- Lack of cognitive confidence and the 
 
Cangas, Perez- 
 
proneness (RHS)   
 
university students 
 
MCQ-65 
 
thought control strategy worry contributed 
 
Alvarez, Fidalgo     
 
(N=155).   
 
towards vulnerability to auditory 
 
& Gutierrez,         
 
hallucinations. 
 
(2006b)           
 
 
Stirling, Barkus 
 
 
Hallucination- 
 
 
Correlational 
 
 
Non-clinical 
 
 
MCQ-65 
 
 
-Highly hallucination-prone individuals 
 
& Lewis (2007) 
 
proneness (LSHS &   
 
university students 
 
MCQ-th 
 
scored higher on awareness and usefulness of 
 
 
O-LIFE)   
 
(N=106).   
 
controlling thoughts, uncontrollability and 
         
 
danger and negative beliefs about the 
         
 
consequences of thinking. 
 
-Schizotypy also correlated with 
         
 
metacognitive beliefs. 
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Morrison &  Visual and auditory  Correlational  Non-clinical  MCQ-65  -Positive, significant correlations were found 
 
Petersen (2003) 
 
hallucination-   
 
undergraduate 
 
IVI 
 
between auditory hallucinations and 
 
 
proneness (RHS)   
 
students & 
 
warehouse operatives 
 
 
‘uncontrollability and danger’ and ‘lack of 
 
cognitive confidence’. 
     
 
(N=64).     
 
 
 
 
 
Jones &  Auditory  Correlational  Non-clinical  WBSI  - Both subscales of the WBSI were positively 
 
Fernyhough 
 
(2006) 
 
hallucination- 
 
proneness (LSHS-R) 
 
 
undergraduate 
 
students (N=751). 
 
WBSI (sup) 
 
MCQ-30 
 
correlated with hallucination-proneness. 
 
 
 
Note. LSHS = Launay-Slade Hallucinations Scale; RHS = Revised Hallucination Scale; LSHS-R = Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale-Revised; MCQ-65 = 
Metacognitions Questionnaire-65; MCQ-th = Metacognitions-thinking Questionnaire; MCQ-30 = Metacognitions Questionnaire – 30; TCQ = Thought 
Control Questionnaire; IVI = Interpretations of Voices Inventory; FFMQ = The Five Factors Mindfulness Questionnaire; O-LIFE = The Oxford and 
Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences; WBSI = White Bear Suppression Inventory; WBSI (sup) = White Bear Suppression Inventory – 
suppression items. 
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Metacognition and General Psychosis 
 
 
 
 
The following studies are included because delusions and hallucinations are 
frequently grouped together (Table 5). This literature may clarify the relationship between 
metacognition and the positive symptoms of psychosis generally. 
Three studies investigated metacognition as a vulnerability factor among non-clinical 
populations in hallucination and delusion-proneness (Campbell & Morrison, 2007; Laroi & 
Van der Linden, 2005; Reeder, Rexhepi-Johansson & Wykes, 2010). Hallucination and 
delusion-proneness and the predictive power of positive and negative metacognitive beliefs 
were investigated (Laroi & Van der Linden, 2005). Among the LSHS (Launay & Slade, 
1981) factors that correlated with the PDI (Peters et al., 1999) were auditory hallucinations, 
suggesting a positive relationship between symptoms. Following a median split, 
hallucination-prone participants endorsed more maladaptive metacognitive beliefs with the 
exception of ‘positive beliefs about worry’. However, ‘positive beliefs about worry’ and 
‘uncontrollability and danger of thoughts’ were the best predictors of hallucinations. The 
delusion-prone group demonstrated similar results with the addition of ‘lack of cognitive 
confidence’. The best predictor of suspiciousness and persecutory ideas was also ‘positive 
beliefs about worry’. 
Results suggest that hallucinations and delusions may share common underlying 
metacognitive processes that predispose individuals to anomalous experience. Given that the 
LSHS and PDI assess a wide-range of hallucinations and delusions, metacognition may not 
uniquely contribute towards suspiciousness and auditory hallucinations, but also to a wide- 
range of symptoms under the umbrella terms of hallucinations and delusions. Analysing this 
data together also complicates the comparisons with more symptom-specific studies. The use 
of a median split also has its limitations. It makes it more difficult to find effects that are 
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really there, weakening the power of any results found and turns a continuous variable into a 
 
categorical one, meaning that participants categorised as ‘highly-prone’ are seen as equal. 
 
Campbell and Morrison (2007) investigated thought control strategies and psychosis- 
specific metacognitive beliefs (BaPS, Morrison et al., 1995) as predictors of hallucination and 
delusion-proneness.  Both positive and negative beliefs about psychotic phenomena were 
significantly positively associated with the frequency of both hallucinations and delusions. 
The frequency of hallucinations was predicted by positive beliefs and metaphysical beliefs 
about voices whereas significant predictors of delusion frequency were positive beliefs, 
survival beliefs and negative beliefs about paranoia. These results are consistent with 
Morrison (2001) who hypothesised that positive beliefs about psychosis are associated with 
the occurrence of these phenomena; however, positive beliefs explained little of the variance 
once negative beliefs were taken into account. A very small number of positive beliefs were 
endorsed across the sample (M=4.8, SD=1.5) compared to negative beliefs (M=22.8, SD 
=8.4). 
 
General distress, measured by the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ; Goldberg & 
Hillier, 1979) was associated with both positive and negative appraisals of voices and 
delusions. Negative beliefs about paranoia were most strongly related to distress, in line with 
Morrison (2001). In addition, the thought control strategies ‘punishment’ and ‘worry’ were 
associated with distress and delusion and hallucination-frequency. 
One study aimed to address the inconsistent findings regarding metacognitive 
 
beliefs, exploring metacognitive beliefs about cognitive skills (Reeder et al., 2010). ‘Negative 
beliefs about thoughts’ were identified as a result of high loadings onto four subscales of the 
MCQ-30
17. This suggests that negative metacognitive beliefs are associated with psychotic- 
like phenomena, in line with Morrison (2001). ‘Cognitive confidence’ was also identified and 
 
 
17 Positive beliefs, uncontrollability and danger, general negative beliefs about thoughts and cognitive self- 
consciousness. 
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loaded highly onto ‘cognitive confidence’ of the MCQ-30 and  ‘beliefs about cognitive 
regulation’ (the extent individuals think they have control over their thinking) was identified 
through high loadings on the Metacognitive Assessment Inventory
18 (MAI; Baer, Smith, 
Hopkins, Krietmeyer & Toney, 2006) and ‘positive beliefs’ subscale of the MCQ-30. 
This study suggested the presence of metacognitive beliefs about thoughts and also 
cognitive skills in psychotic-like phenomena, however owing to the measures used, it is 
unclear whether beliefs about one’s own thoughts or beliefs about thoughts in general are 
captured (Reeder et al., 2010). This ambiguity may lead to different interpretations of 
questionnaire items by respondents, which may increase the possibility of invalid results; a 
general methodological limitation of sole reliance on self-report questionnaires. 
Two studies investigated the psychological factors that may contribute towards the 
transition from risk of developing psychosis to clinical levels of symptoms, with the aim of 
targeting these processes early in order to prevent transition (Morrison et al., 2002b; 
Morrison et al., 2006). Individuals at high-risk and non-patients were randomised to one of 
two conditions; monitoring only or cognitive therapy with monitoring. At month 20 of 30, the 
high-risk group scored significantly higher than non-patients on ‘uncontrollability and danger 
of thoughts’, ‘lack of cognitive confidence’, ‘cognitive self-consciousness’ and ‘general 
negative beliefs’. However, no significant difference was found between groups on ‘positive 
beliefs about worry’, similar to the findings of Laroi and Van der Linden (2005) in a non- 
clinical sample. 
Building on these preliminary findings, Morrison et al. (2006) compared individuals 
with at-risk mental states (ARMS) with non-patients to determine the relative contribution of 
metacognitive factors in this vulnerable population. ARMS patients scored higher on some 
negative metacognitive factors, including ‘uncontrollability and danger of thoughts’, ‘general 
 
 
18 The MAI measured cognitive skill. An example of an item: ‘I think of several ways to solve a problem and 
choose the best one’. 
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negative beliefs’ and ‘cognitive self-consciousness’. Findings differed to Morrison et al. 
(2002b), as here, statistically significant differences were not found. Positive associations 
were also found between negative metacognitive beliefs about ‘uncontrollability and danger’ 
and ‘general negative beliefs’ and symptoms associated with at-risk patients, including 
perceived stress, which may suggest a relationship between negative metacognitive beliefs 
and stress in response to psychotic phenomena. Although consistent with the S-REF model, 
this study failed to report relative proportions of participants with auditory hallucinations and 
persecutory delusions. 
Voice-hearers with several psychotic disorders were compared to individuals with 
persecutory delusions, panic and non-patients (Morrison & Wells, 2003) to investigate 
metacognition across emotional and psychotic disorder. Individuals with auditory 
hallucinations exhibited higher levels of all metacognitive beliefs apart from ‘cognitive self- 
consciousness’ and the persecutory delusions group had comparable levels of ‘positive 
beliefs’ and ‘cognitive self-consciousness’ to panic patients, suggesting a close process 
relationship between these clinical groups. These findings suggest that metacognitive beliefs 
lead to interpretation biases that lead to psychotic experience. This study does not describe 
how persecutory delusions were defined and although conclusions are drawn about auditory 
hallucinations, all participants in the voice-hearer group had comorbid delusional beliefs. 
Brett, Johns, Peters and McGuire., (2009) explored  metacognitive beliefs across the 
continuum of psychosis. ARMS patients and patients with psychosis scored higher than non- 
patients and the ‘undiagnosed’ group (experiencing psychotic-like symptoms
19) most 
consistently on ‘general negative beliefs’. The ARMS group scored significantly higher on 
 
 
 
 
19 Participants were included in the ‘undiagnosed’ group only if their anomalous experiences had a duration of 
more than 5 years. This distinguished them from the ‘At risk’ group as psychosis usually develops within two 
years of experiencing anomalous symptoms. 
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metacognitive beliefs (apart from positive beliefs) than the non-clinical control group and 
significantly higher on ‘general negative beliefs’ than the undiagnosed group. However, the 
ARMS and clinical group did not significantly differ on any subscale, suggesting that 
metacognitive beliefs alone do not predict transition to psychosis. When anxiety was 
controlled, significant differences were lost, and when depression was controlled, all but 
‘positive beliefs’ and ‘general negative beliefs’ remained as significant predictors. This study 
suggests that metacognitive processes are more closely related to general psychopathology, 
particularly anxiety and depression, rather than directly stemming from psychotic experiences 
and suggests that anxiety itself requires addressing in psychosis treatment, rather than the 
psychotic experience. 
While the studies discussed suggest that metacognitive variables including negative 
metacognitive beliefs are more highly present in at-risk to psychosis groups compared to non- 
patient controls, they do not address the potential differences between at-risk and diagnosed 
psychotic groups. This was addressed by Morrison, French and Wells (2007). Based on the S- 
REF model, patients with a range of psychotic disorders and patients at risk were expected to 
present with higher levels of metacognitive beliefs than non-patients and patients with 
psychotic disorders were expected to endorse more maladaptive metacognitive beliefs than 
those at-risk (Morrison et al., 2007). Both hypotheses were supported by the results. 
Metacognitive beliefs were endorsed more by the two patient groups than non-patients. 
Furthermore, ‘positive beliefs about worry’ alone were higher in the psychotic group than the 
at-risk group. The authors conclude that negative beliefs about thoughts may predispose 
people to anxiety, although anxiety was not measured, which they believe explains the results 
of hypothesis one. Psychosis occurs when positive beliefs about worry are high, which would 
fit with previous findings of no differences between non-patients and at-risk patients on 
measures of positive beliefs about worry (Morrison et al., 2002b; Morrison et al., 2006). 
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More recently, White & Gumley., (2010) explored associations between intolerance 
of uncertainty, specific metacognitive beliefs relating to psychosis and distress. Growing 
evidence suggests that intolerance of uncertainty leads to the development of unhelpful 
beliefs and delusions in psychosis (Broome et al., 2007). A small sample of patients currently 
distressed by their psychosis with post-psychotic PTSD were asked to complete a battery of 
measures. Seventy-eight percent of this sample experienced hallucinations, but no mention is 
made of the proportion of other positive symptoms experienced. Intolerance of uncertainty 
(IUS
20; Freeston, Rhe’ume, Letarte, Dugas & Ladouceur, 1994) was hypothesised to be 
associated with negative metacognitive beliefs about voices and paranoia (BaPS; Morrison et 
al., 2005). 
Intolerance of uncertainty was hypothesised to associate with levels of distress, as 
measured by the Impact of Event Scale-Revised (IES-R; Weiss & Marmar, 1997). An 
association was found between intolerance of uncertainty and negative appraisals about 
paranoia. It was concluded that intolerance of uncertainty may predispose individuals to 
possess negative metacognitive beliefs (White & Gumley, 2010), which may lead to distress 
or predispose individuals to appraise a situation as ambiguous, jumping to a threatening 
conclusion. Conversely, previous experiences of psychosis may influence the association 
between intolerance of uncertainty and metacognitive beliefs. It is unclear whether this study 
taps into current or past metacognitive factors, since the IES-R was used to explain the worst 
moment 
of their illness. Intolerance of uncertainty is implicated in the maintenance of GAD (Dugas & 
Robichaud, 2007) and may represent another process dually implicated in psychosis and 
anxiety that warrants further investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 The IUS contains 27 items measuring emotional, cognitive and behavioural reactions to ambiguous 
situations, the implications of being uncertain and attempts to control the future. The measure has high 
internal consistency (.91) and can effectively distinguish between individuals with and without GAD. 
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Table 5 
 
Characteristics of general psychosis papers 
 
Authors  Symptom Studied  Design  Sample 
 
characteristics 
Instruments used to 
 
assess Metacognition 
Main findings 
Laroi & Van  Hallucination & delusion-  Correlational  University students  MCQ-65  - Participants who were prone to 
 
der Linden 
 
proneness   
 
(N=296).   
 
hallucinations and delusions scored 
 
(2005) 
 
LSHS       
 
significantly higher on most MCQ-65 
subscales and total score. 
 
 
Campbell & 
 
 
Hallucination & delusion- 
 
 
Cross-sectional 
 
 
University students 
 
 
TCQ 
 
 
- Avoidant safety behaviours and 
 
Morrison 
 
proneness 
 
survey 
 
(N=544). 
 
IVI 
 
punishment-based thought control 
 
(2007) 
 
LSHS-R     
 
BaPS 
 
strategies were found to be associated 
 
with distress and frequency of 
         
 
psychotic – like symptoms. 
 
 
Reeder, 
 
 
Psychotic-like experiences 
 
 
Correlational 
 
 
Non-clinical general 
 
 
MCQ-30 
 
 
- Three components of metacognitive 
 
Rexhepi-     
 
public (N=60). 
 
MAI 
 
beliefs were identified and only 
 
 
 
57 METACOGNITION AND THE POSITIVE SYMPTOMS OF PSYCHOSIS 
 
 
Johansson & 
Wykes (2010) 
‘general beliefs about thoughts’ was 
significantly associated with psychotic- 
like experiences. 
 
 
 
 
White & 
Gumley (2010) 
DSM-IV Schizophrenia  Cross-sectional 
correlational 
design 
Distressed patients 
 
(N=27). 
IUS 
BaPS 
IVI 
-IUS was positively and significantly 
associated with beliefs about voices 
and paranoia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Morrison et al. 
(2002b) 
At-risk patients  RCT  - High-risk 
psychosis patients 
(n=31). 
- Non-clinical 
controls of 
undergraduate 
students and staff 
(n=50). 
MCQ-65  - High risk group scored significantly 
higher on measures of metacognitive 
beliefs. 
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Morrison, 
 
French & 
DSM-IV Schizophrenia 
 
spectrum disorder 
Cross-sectional  Schizophrenia 
 
spectrum disorder 
MCQ-65  - Patients with psychotic disorders and 
 
at risk group scored higher on 
 
Wells (2007) 
 
(Schizophrenia;   
 
(n=73).   
 
metacognitive beliefs. 
 
 
schizoaffective;   
 
- ARMS patients     
 
 
Schizophreniform)   
 
(n=43).     
     
 
- Non-patient     
     
 
undergraduate     
     
 
students (n=188).     
 
 
Morrison et al. 
 
 
Ultra-high risk patients 
 
 
Cross-sectional 
 
 
- Ultra-high risk 
 
 
MCQ-65 
 
 
-Metacognitive beliefs were positively 
 
(2006) 
 
PANSS   
 
patients (n=58). -   
 
associated with several dimensions of 
     
 
Non-patients (n=56).   
 
symptomatology of at-risk patients. 
 
 
 
Brett, Johns, 
 
 
 
Psychotic disorder. 
 
 
 
Correlational 
 
 
 
- Diagnosed group 
 
 
 
MCQ-65 
 
 
 
- Most group differences became non- 
 
Peters & 
 
AANEX   
 
(n=27).   
 
significant when anxiety and 
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McGuire 
 
(2009) 
- At risk group 
 
(n=32). 
 
- Undiagnosed sub- 
clinical group 
(n=24). 
- Non-clinical 
 
control (n=32). 
depression were controlled for. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Morrison &  DSM-IV Schizophrenia,  Correlational  - Voice-hearer group  MCQ-65  -Participants with auditory 
 
Wells (2003) 
 
Schizoaffective disorder,   
 
(n=49).   
 
hallucinations exhibited higher levels 
 
 
Schizophreniform disorder   
 
- Persecutory   
 
of dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs. 
 
 
delusions Group     
 
(n=24). 
 
- Panic disorder 
   
 
group (n=35). -Non-     
 
patient control     
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(n=50). 
 
Note. LSHS = Launay-Slade Hallucinations Scale; LSHS-R = Launay-Slade Hallucinations Scale-Revised; MCQ-65 = Metacognitions Questionnaire-65; 
TCQ = Thought Control Questionnaire; IVI = Interpretations of Voices Questionnaire; Beliefs about Paranoia Scale; IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; 
RCT = randomised-controlled trial; ARMS = At Risk Mental State; PANSS = Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale; MAI = Metacognitive Assessment 
Inventory; AANEX = Appraisals of Anomalous Experiences Interview. 
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Discussion 
 
 
 
 
This review has examined research that investigates the role of metacognition in 
persecutory delusions and auditory hallucinations. There is a wealth of evidence to 
suggest that metacognitive beliefs and strategies are implicated in clinical and non- 
clinical populations. There is also strong evidence to suggest that anxiety mediates the 
relationship between hallucinations and delusions, and metacognitive beliefs and thought 
control strategies. 
However, the general use of cross-sectional designs limits the ability to establish 
causality, for example to conclude whether thought control strategies lead to increased 
anxiety and an increase in paranoia or whether beliefs about the uncontrollability and 
danger of thoughts lead to the maintenance of auditory hallucinations. In addition, the 
majority of studies have analysed auditory and visual hallucinations together, or all 
positive symptoms together because of their frequent co-occurrence. This reflects the 
complexity of psychosis and presents difficulties in deciphering the role of metacognition 
specifically in auditory hallucinations. Non-clinical studies address these limitations but 
have their own shortcomings. 
Metacognitive beliefs have received the most attention, with mixed results 
reported. Metacognitive strategies and awareness have therefore been neglected, with 
some recent notable exceptions (Freeman & Garety, 1999; Jones & Fernyhough, 2006; 
Morrison & Wells. 2000; Newman-Taylor et al., 2009). These studies found emerging 
support for the use of worry and punishment thought control strategies, thought 
suppression and experiential avoidance across clinical and non-clinical auditory 
hallucinations and persecutory delusions. These metacognitive strategies warrant further 
exploration using an experimental design. 
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The cognitive models offered to explain the predisposing and maintenance factors 
underlying these psychotic symptoms incorporate some metacognitive beliefs, but do not 
account for the breadth of metacognitive processes, for example experiential avoidance, 
that may also contribute. Instead, most of the findings of this literature review point to the 
S-REF model as a ‘best fit’; that metacognitive beliefs associated both with psychotic 
symptoms and general worry contribute to both the predisposition and maintenance of 
psychological distress in psychosis. Maladaptive coping strategies including experiential 
avoidance, thought control and suppression, may lead to a general maladaptive thinking 
style; the CAS, in line with earlier research that linked underlying processes between 
emotional and psychotic disorder (Freeman & Garety, 2003). 
Clinically, the findings support the consideration of metacognitive processes in the 
formulation and treatment of psychosis and the application of metacognitive therapy 
(Moritz, Veckenstedt, Randjbar, Vitzthum & Woodward, 2011), perhaps combined with 
cognitive-behavioural approaches to the treatment of positive psychotic symptoms. Future 
research should conduct randomised controlled-trials of metacognitive therapy, closely 
measuring outcomes of metacognition and distress, to investigate the efficacy of this 
treatment for psychosis. In addition, through the induction of anxiety, non-clinical 
experimental studies may help to clarify the metacognitive strategies that are implicated 
in the maintenance of distress in either paranoia or hallucinations. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
The findings overall suggest a stronger relationship between paranoia and 
metacognition, possibly owing to the wealth of research that has demonstrated a close 
process relationship between paranoia and anxiety. In addition, the findings indicate a 
need to consider metacognition in the formulation and treatment of individuals presenting 
with positive psychotic symptoms. Future research should focus on exploring these 
relationships experimentally and drawing direct comparisons between clinical and non- 
clinical levels of hallucinations and delusions in order to further understand the 
metacognitive factors that may be involved in the transition to clinical psychosis. 
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The Empirical Paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the role of metacognition in the maintenance of distress in non-clinical 
paranoia 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
Paranoia is defined as ‘the self-referent assumption that one is the object or target 
of another’s thought or behaviour, an assumption that is often unfounded’ (Fenigstein & 
Vanable, 1992, p.129). Paranoia is now well established as existing on a continuum with 
normal experience (Ellett, Lopes & Chadwick, 2003; Freeman et al., 2005; Freeman et 
al., 2008a; Freeman et al., 2011; van Os, Hanssen, Bijl & Ravelli, 2000) and has been 
theoretically framed by the Paranoia Hierarchy (Freeman, 2007), which describes 
relatively common social evaluative concerns. These concerns are hypothesised to be a 
risk factor in the development of persecutory delusions, (Freeman & Garety, 2003) 
through to the severe threat experienced by individuals with persecutory delusions 
(Freeman, 2007). 
Metacognition refers to the process of thinking and has been likened to ‘the score 
and the conductor behind thinking’ (Wells, 2009, p. 1). Flavell (1979) was instrumental in 
the development of this concept and in recent years, metacognition has been applied to 
depression and anxiety (Teasdale, 1999; Wells & Matthews, 1994) and most recently, to 
psychosis (Fraser, Morrison & Wells, 2006; Morrison & Wells, 2000, 2007). 
Metacognition ‘monitors, controls, and appraises the products and process of awareness’ 
(Wells, 2009, p. 1). Wells and Matthews (1994) developed the Self-Regulatory Executive 
Function model (S-REF) and hypothesised that psychological disorder develops when 
individuals become stuck in an unhelpful relationship with their thoughts, known as the 
Cognitive Attentional Syndrome (CAS). The CAS consists of metacognitive strategies, 
which function to alter thinking in order to control cognitive and emotional responses. 
Examples of metacognitive strategies include thought suppression, thought control, worry 
and rumination, which are consciously or unconsciously drawn upon to manage unwanted 
cognitive activity. 
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Metacognitive knowledge, the beliefs and theories people have about their own 
thinking (Wells, 2009, p. 5), affects individuals’ responses to thoughts and emotions and 
is deemed positive if an individual is aware that thoughts are not always correct 
(Teasdale, 1999). The ability to decentre or step back from one’s thoughts is likely to be a 
 
protective factor against the development of psychopathology (Fresco et al., 2007). 
 
Cognitive treatment for emotional disorders, influenced by Beck (1976), 
hypothesises that altering the content of depressive or anxious thoughts leads to decreased 
depression or anxiety. Although metacognitive theorists agree to some extent that these 
thoughts lead to psychological disorder, through the increase in associated distressing 
emotions and subsequent use of safety behaviours to manage threat, metacognitive theory 
hypothesises that addressing the content of thoughts alone is insufficient for effective, 
long-term change (Wells, 2009). It is argued that traditional cognitive theory fails to 
explain why transitory distressing thoughts or feelings become chronic, leading to serious 
mental health problems. A metacognitive approach assumes that the relationship to 
thoughts, feelings and other inner experiences must also be addressed. There is now good 
evidence demonstrating that interventions targeting people’s relationship to their internal 
experience lead to a reduction in risk of relapse in recurrent depression (Teasdale, 1999; 
Teasdale et al., 2002). 
The first step towards recognising that metacognition may play a role in paranoia 
was the increasing focus on a psychological understanding of positive psychotic 
symptoms.  This has partly been achieved through an awareness of the similarities 
between psychotic and emotional disorders (Freeman, 2007; Freeman & Garety, 2003). 
The psychological literature strongly suggests that both psychosis and emotional disorder 
lie on a continuum with normal experience, that they are both often triggered by stressful 
life events, therefore underpinned by a stress-vulnerability model, and are both 
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characterised by maladaptive psychological processes, including self-focussed attention, 
the use of safety behaviours, metacognitive beliefs and thought control strategies 
(Freeman & Garety, 2003). 
Specifically, high levels of anxiety and worry have been found to correlate 
positively with delusional distress (Startup, Freeman & Garety, 2007). One study aimed 
to understand the role of anxiety in students displaying non-clinical levels of paranoia 
(Lincoln, Lange, Burau, Exner & Moritz, 2010). Following randomisation to an anxiety 
or neutral condition, participants in the anxiety condition displayed significantly higher 
levels of paranoia and were more likely to jump to conclusions during decision-making. 
Regression analysis suggested that anxiety alone predicted paranoia and jumping to 
conclusions. Higher paranoia baseline scores led to an increase in paranoia following the 
induction of anxiety. This study was limited by an observed increase in other negative 
emotions, therefore anxiety alone may not have predicted increases in paranoia. It does 
provide some evidence for a causal role of anxiety in the formation and perhaps 
exacerbation of paranoia in a non-clinical population. It also demonstrates the utility of 
experimental manipulations. 
This work has been supported by a psychological model of persecutory delusions 
(Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler & Bebbington, 2002) that highlights the central role 
of anxiety in the development of psychotic symptoms. Persecutory delusions are 
conceptualised as threat beliefs, owing to the observed similarities between persecutory 
delusions and anxious thoughts (Freeman & Garety, 2003). Persecutory delusions and 
anxiety share the theme of threat to the self. Understanding delusions as threat beliefs has 
 
opened the possibilities of psychological research in this area (Freeman, 2007). 
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The Application of Metacognition and Anxiety to Paranoia 
 
 
 
Paranoia exists on a continuum and processes underpinning emotional disorders 
contribute to the maintenance of associated distress. Based predominantly on the 
metacognitive theory of generalised anxiety disorder (GAD; Wells & Matthews, 1994), 
recent research has attempted to determine whether metacognitive processes are also 
applicable to an understanding of clinical and non-clinical paranoia. 
The few studies examining the relationship between non-clinical paranoia and 
metacognition in undergraduate populations have found mixed results (Garcia-Montes, et 
al., 2005; Newman-Taylor, Graves & Stopa, 2009; Palmier-Claus, Dunn, Morrison & 
Lewis, 2011). Two studies employed a correlational design to investigate the relationship 
between trait paranoia, metacognitive beliefs and thought control strategies. Newman- 
Taylor et al. (2009) found that the metacognitive strategies ‘punishment’, ‘worry’ and 
‘reappraisal’ (measured using the Thought Control Questionnaire [TCQ]; Wells & 
 
Davies, 1994) correlated positively with trait paranoia (measured using the Paranoia Scale 
[PS], Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). However, the inclusion of anxiety in the regression 
reduced the predictive power of paranoia alone; with anxiety uniquely predicting ‘worry’ 
and ‘punishment’. This suggests the crucial role of affect in the use of thought control 
strategies in paranoia, in line with Lincoln et al. (2010) who also highlighted the positive 
relationship between anxiety and paranoia. Similarly, Garcia-Montes et al. (2005) found 
that the presence of anxiety affected the strength of the relationship between 
metacognitive beliefs (Metacognitive Beliefs Questionnaire [MCQ-65], Cartwright- 
Hatton & Wells, 1997) and paranoid ideation; with ‘lack of cognitive confidence’
21 
remaining the only metacognitive belief uniquely predicted by paranoid ideation. 
Palmier-Claus et al. (2011) employed an experimental design to randomise non-clinical 
 
 
21 ‘Lack of cognitive confidence’ refers to a lack of confidence in one’s own memory and attention 
 
72 METACOGNITION AND THE POSITIVE SYMPTOMS OF PSYCHOSIS 
 
 
participants to a neutral or stress-inducing condition. Following the stress-inducing 
condition, ‘cognitive self-consciousness’, which measures preoccupation with one’s own 
thoughts, significantly moderated the relationship between negative affect and 
suspiciousness. Therefore, stronger preoccupation with one’s own thoughts may 
strengthen the relationship between negative affect and paranoia. 
This research demonstrates the relationship between metacognition and paranoia 
in non-clinical groups. It suggests that when individuals with high levels of non-clinical 
paranoia are under stress, they are more likely to hold specific metacognitive beliefs. In 
addition, research suggests that paranoia is associated with use of particular thought 
control strategies. The predictive power of anxiety in predisposition to persecutory 
delusions and non-clinical paranoia provides further evidence that processes underlying 
emotional and psychotic disorders are far from dissimilar. However, most studies have 
used limited metacognitive measures and adopted non-causal methodological approaches. 
Causal effects, including whether distress causes individuals with paranoia to employ 
thought control strategies, have not been investigated. 
Although there is limited experimental research examining the relationships 
between paranoia and metacognition, several experimental studies have induced paranoia 
by manipulating the environment and focus of attention (Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998; 
Ellett & Chadwick, 2007; Fenigstein, 1984; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992), thereby 
creating an experimental environment in which to investigate paranoia and 
metacognition. Bodner and Mikulincer (1998) randomly assigned students to a number of 
conditions to examine paranoid and depressive responses.  Personal helplessness
22 was 
hypothesised to lead to depressive and paranoid-like responses. Further, that the focus of 
 
 
 
22 Personal helplessness has been defined as ‘the belief that one personally lacks the responses required 
to solve the problems, that others, having the needed responses, could solve them, and that the failure is 
derived from internal causes’ (Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998, p.1010). 
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attention (either internally towards the self or externally) would determine the type of 
response elicited (Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998). Participants in the personal failure 
condition, where unsolvable tasks were presented and random correct and incorrect 
feedback was given, demonstrated the most paranoid-like responses, particularly when 
self-focused attention was increased with the use of a mirror and camera. This study 
demonstrates that the combination of personal failure and attentional focus on threatening 
stimuli produces paranoid cognitions. 
The relationship between attentional focus and paranoid cognitions was also 
investigated by Ellett and Chadwick (2007), who randomised 60 non-clinical students to 
one of six conditions: (1 and 2) neutral or failure task in the control condition, with no 
experimenter or camera present, (3 and 4) neutral or failure task in the experimenter 
condition, with the experimenter but no camera present, (5 and 6) neutral or failure task in 
the camera condition, with a camera focussed on the participant without the experimenter 
present. In line with their hypotheses, there was a significant main effect of environment; 
with participants in the camera condition scoring significantly higher on the PS 
(Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992), than the other conditions. Although, there was no effect of 
task on paranoia scores, depression scores were significantly higher in the failure 
condition. This provides further evidence to suggest that paranoia can be manipulated by 
increasing attentional focus with the use of a mirror and that failure alone is insufficient 
to induce paranoia. This fits theoretically with a model of clinical paranoia in which 
persecutory delusions are defined as ‘threat beliefs’ (Morrison, 2001).  Importantly, both 
Bodner and Mikulincer (1998) and Ellet and Chadwick (2007) failed to measure 
attentional focus, and assumed that their findings resulted from the environmental 
manipulation. 
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Alongside personal failure and attentional focus, research suggests that self- 
consciousness, in particular public self-consciousness, is associated with paranoia. Self- 
consciousness consists of a public (awareness of the self in relation to the world and how 
others perceive you) and private (awareness of inner thoughts and feelings about the self) 
factors (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). It is argued that this relationship exists because 
paranoia is unable to develop without a social context, as public self-consciousness is 
highly correlated with non-clinical paranoia. In an earlier experimental study, students 
were more likely to perceive themselves, compared to another, as a target of a negative 
event (an exam), suggesting that self-consciousness influences the sense of the self as a 
target of other peoples’ thoughts and actions (Fenigstein, 1984). The experimental 
paranoia research to date suggests that an induction of public and private self- 
consciousness leads to state and trait worry (Wells, 1997) and the perception of the self as 
a target of threat (Fenigstein, 1984; Govern & Marsch, 2001). It is hypothesised that this 
may lead to a greater use of metacognitive strategies to control unwanted inner 
experiences derived from the perception of the self as target. 
Owing to the emerging evidence implicating metacognition in the experience of 
paranoia, an experimental study is warranted. The metacognitive variables of interest to 
this study (those implicated in the CAS (Wells & Matthews, 1994) which functions to 
alter thinking) will now be outlined. 
Thought control is a metacognitive strategy employed to manage unpleasant 
thoughts (Wells & Davies, 1994). The role of thought control is well established in the 
maintenance of distress in emotional disorders. These strategies are hypothesised to 
maintain distress in emotional disorders through the paradoxical effect of increasing the 
frequency of unpleasant thoughts, leading to more distress and further attempts at control 
(Amir, Cashman & Foa, 1997; Coles & Heimberg, 2005). Within non-clinical paranoia, 
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high levels of uncontrollability of thought (Freeman & Garety, 1999) suggest that anxiety 
processes underlie paranoia and that thought control strategies in particular may be 
implicated in the management of distress associated with unwanted thoughts. Preliminary 
research suggests that ‘re-appraisal’, ‘punishment’ and ‘worry’ correlate positively with 
paranoia (Newman-Taylor et al., 2009). The latter two strategies have also been 
implicated in clinical paranoia populations (Morrison & Wells, 2000). 
Thought suppression, which involves attempts to avoid thinking about unpleasant 
thoughts, is another form of control. Experimental research suggests that the suppression 
of an unwanted thought leads to an increased preoccupation with the thought and to 
distress (Wegner, Schneider, Carter & White, 1987). The presence of thought suppression 
has been demonstrated in non-clinical populations of individuals with persecutory-like 
beliefs and hallucinations (Jones & Fernyhough, 2006; Jones & Fernyhough, 2008). Jones 
and Fernyhough (2008) used a correlational design to investigate the relationship between 
persecutory-like beliefs and thought suppression (using the White Bear Suppression 
Inventory [WBSI]; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) in a non-clinical population. When anxiety 
was high, thought suppression was implicated in the experience of persecutory-like 
beliefs, suggesting that thought suppression is activated at times of distress. Similarly, in 
participants with hallucination-proneness, metacognitive beliefs about the 
uncontrollability and danger of thoughts correlated with thought suppression (Jones & 
Fernyhough, 2006). 
Experiential avoidance, another metacognitive strategy, occurs when an individual 
 
‘is unwilling to remain in contact with particular private events’ (Hayes et al., 2004, p. 
554). This includes emotions, thoughts and physiological sensations, and attempts are 
made to change these experiences, akin to thought suppression. Although experiential 
avoidance leads to an initial positive effect of reducing discomfort, it has the long-term 
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effect of maintaining distress associated with the private events. An example is worrying 
about not being able to control worries. Experiential avoidance is also related to other 
metacognitive strategies including thought suppression (Hayes et al., 2004). The role of 
experiential avoidance has been investigated recently as a vulnerability pathway to 
clinical auditory hallucinations. Findings suggest that individuals with hallucinations 
experience higher levels of dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs and lower meta- 
awareness (Goldstone, Farhall & Ong, 2012), providing further support for a relationship 
between aspects of metacognition (beliefs and experiential avoidance). Experiential 
avoidance therefore warrants investigation in a paranoid population as it has been 
demonstrated as a maintenance factor of distress in emotional disorders and in psychosis. 
Rumination is related to the metacognitive construct of ‘cognitive self- 
consciousness’; the preoccupation with one’s own thought processes (Jones & 
Fernyhough, 2009) and represents a crucial strategy employed in the maintenance of 
anxiety disorders (Wells & Carter, 2001) yet it has not been experimentally explored in 
relation to paranoia. Rumination may maintain paranoia-related distress through a 
repeated focus on the paranoid thought, reinforcing its importance and validity. 
Metacognitive awareness is ‘a cognitive set in which negative thoughts/feelings 
are experienced as mental events rather than as the self’ (Teasdale et al., 2002, p. 275). 
Metacognitive awareness has not been explored in relation to paranoia. Low 
metacognitive awareness has been implicated in vulnerability to and maintenance of 
emotional disorders, including depression. The psychological factor hypothesised to 
maintain distress and depression is the inability to recognise depressive symptoms as 
symptoms. Similarly, individuals with non-clinical paranoia may demonstrate low 
metacognitive awareness. Individuals believe their paranoid thoughts, for example, that 
‘people are watching me’ or ‘other people are always talking behind my back’. Low 
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metacognitive awareness is defined as ‘the inability to distinguish the self from the 
content of negative thoughts and emotions (seeing the self as defined by or as 
synonymous with negative mental content)’ (Hargus, Crane, Barnhofer & Williams, 
2010, p.35). Whereas some individuals may have these same thoughts yet not attach or 
become cognitively fused to them (i.e. demonstrate the ability to decentre (Teasdale et al., 
2002)), others’ beliefs remain strong as a result of this fusion. Individuals may therefore 
enlist metacognitive strategies to manage this fusion, perpetuating the paranoia. 
Mindfulness- based cognitive therapy (MBCT) has been shown to significantly increase 
meta- awareness in suicidally-depressed individuals when compared to treatment as usual 
(Hargus et al., 2010), indicating that participants were more able to view their depressive 
symptoms as just symptoms following an increase in metacognitive awareness, with 
beneficial effects. 
 
 
 
 
The Present Study 
 
 
 
 
This study investigated metacognitive strategies and metacognitive awareness in 
individuals with high and low non-clinical paranoia. An anxiety-induction task was used 
to explore the metacognitive factors implicated in the maintenance of distress. The 
current study addresses some of the methodological limitations of previous work, and 
extends the exploration of metacognitive variables in non-clinical paranoia. 
The rationale for conducting this study is based on preliminary evidence for a 
relationship between paranoia, metacognitive strategies and anxiety. Paranoid thoughts 
may lead to anxiety and to subsequent attempts to control thoughts. This may have the 
paradoxical effect of increasing distress. This study also builds on the findings of Flower 
(2010) who investigated the cognitive maintenance factors associated with anxiety in 
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individuals with high and low paranoia. Limitations of Flower (2010) include the absence 
of a control condition, no measurement of pre-manipulation self-awareness or paranoid 
cognitions and a limited range of metacognitive variables investigated. These findings 
will be re-investigated with the addition of a control condition. This will produce a more 
robust design to test whether metacognitive strategies are demonstrated only by 
individuals high in paranoia exposed to an anxiety-induction or regardless. Flower (2010) 
found no significant differences between high and low paranoia groups on attentional 
focus. This will be re-investigated. The study will also extend paranoia research by 
examining the role of metacognitive awareness in paranoia distress. 
There is also preliminary evidence for the effectiveness of a task designed to 
induce mild anxiety (Flower, 2010), adapted from Bodner and Mikulincer, 1998. It is a 
computerised task based on personal helplessness theory. Flower (2010) found that 
following the task, participants in the high paranoia group reported significantly more 
state anxiety. A significant effect of group was found on paranoid thoughts after the task, 
showing that individuals high in paranoia experienced more paranoid thoughts owing to 
the anxiety-activation task. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
 
1. There will be a main effect of paranoia (high versus low) on affective and 
metacognitive processes: high paranoia will be associated with increased state and trait 
anxiety, attentional focus, increased use of metacognitive strategies (thought control, 
suppression, experiential avoidance and rumination) and lower metacognitive awareness 
(cognitive fusion and decentring) regardless of task type. 
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2. There will be a main effect of experimental task (anxiety versus control) on affective 
and metacognitive processes. The anxiety task will be associated with increased state 
anxiety, attentional focus, use of metacognitive strategies and level of metacognitive 
awareness, irrespective of paranoia level. 
 
 
 
3. There will be an interaction between paranoia and task. We expect participants with 
high paranoia in the anxiety-induction condition to report the highest number of paranoid 
cognitions, attentional focus, anxiety, more use of metacognitive strategies and lower 
metacognitive awareness than the other three groups. 
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Method 
 
 
 
 
Design 
 
 
 
A 2X2 (paranoia X condition) between-subject experimental design was employed 
to test the above hypotheses. The independent variables were level of paranoia (high 
versus low) and experimental task (anxiety versus control). The dependent variables were 
anxiety, paranoia, attentional focus, metacognitive awareness and metacognitive 
strategies. School ethical approval was granted (see Appendix B). 
 
 
 
 
Participants 
 
 
 
Participants were staff and students from a local university. Table 1 details the 
demographic data of the sample. Participants completed the PS (Fenigstein & Vanable, 
1992) to determine high and low paranoia groups, based on the mean PS (Fenigstein and 
Vanable (1992) score for a non-clinical group (M = 42.7, SD = 10.2). In order to 
determine the high and low paranoia groups, participants fell into the 84
th percentile or 
above (+1 SD above the mean, equalling a score of 52.7 and above) or the 16
th percentile 
 
or below (-1 SD below the mean, equalling a score of 32.7 or below). There were no other 
inclusion or exclusion criteria. Owing to slow recruitment, these cut-offs were rounded 
respectively down or up. Figure 1 displays the flow of recruitment. 
Power was calculated using G*Power Statistic Version 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & 
 
Buchner, 2007). Assuming that an effect size of at least that of Flower (2010) was 
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obtained
23, at least 80 participants in total (20 per group) were required to test a two-tailed 
 
hypothesis, with 80% power and a 5% significance level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 Based on the findings of Flower (2010): White Bear Suppression Inventory effect size = 0.5 and the 
Thought Control Questionnaire ‘punishment’ subscale effect size of 0.3. 
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Table 1 
 
Demographic data for each group 
 
  High 
 
Experimental 
Low 
 
Experimental 
High 
 
Control 
Low 
 
Control 
Age         
 
Mean (SD) 
 
21.13 (3.40) 
 
21.1 (3.06) 
 
20.06 (1.99) 
 
20.9 (3.26) 
 
Range 
 
18-31 
 
18-30 
 
18-26 
 
18-29 
 
Gender         
 
Male 
 
4 
 
4 
 
6 
 
3 
 
Female 
 
12 
 
16 
 
11 
 
17 
 
Educational         
 
Level         
 
Undergraduate 
 
15 
 
18 
 
17 
 
20 
 
Postgraduate 
 
1 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Staff 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Ethnicity         
 
White British 
 
7 
 
14 
 
11 
 
15 
 
Black British 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Asian 
 
5 
 
1 
 
5 
 
1 
 
Mixed 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Other 
 
2 
 
4 
 
1 
 
4 
Note. High = high paranoia group; Low = low paranoia group; Experimental = anxiety- 
 
induction condition; Control = neutral condition. 
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Phase 1 
 
Completed the Paranoia Scale 
 
N = 458 
High paranoia (n = 63) 
Low paranoia (n = 152) 
 
 
Not suitable for Phase 2 (scores 
ranged between and inclusive of 34- 
51) 
 
n = 243) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Invited to Phase 2 
 
High paranoia (n=63) 
Low paranoia (n =73) 
Did not respond to Phase 2 
invitation 
High paranoia (n = 15) 
Low paranoia (n = 25) 
 
 
 
  Did not attend Phase 2 
 
High paranoia (n=4) 
Low paranoia (n=1) 
  Attended but no longer 
suitable 
High paranoia (n=11) 
Low paranoia (n=7) 
 
 
 
Randomised to participate in 
anxiety condition 
 
  Low (n = 20) 
  High (n = 16) 
Randomised to participate in 
control condition 
 
  Low (n = 20) 
  High (n = 17) 
 
 
Figure 1. Consort diagram of data attrition 
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Materials 
 
 
 
Copies of questionnaires are detailed in Appendix C. 
 
 
 
 
Paranoia Scale (PS; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). This 20-item self-report 
questionnaire measures non-clinical trait paranoia in college samples. Items were based 
upon a clinical measure of paranoia; measuring four areas (1) the belief that other people 
or external powerful sources are trying to influence one’s behaviour or thinking (2) belief 
of a conspiracy (3) the belief of being spied on or talked about (4) general suspicion or 
mistrust. Respondents rate the applicability of items on a 5-point Likert scale (1 indicates 
‘not at all applicable’, 5 indicates ‘extremely applicable’). The scale has good internal 
consistency (α = .84) and convergent and discriminant validity. Scores on this measure 
range from 20 to 100 with higher scores indicating greater paranoia. 
 
 
 
Paranoia and Depression Scale (PDS; Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998). 
 
This 17-item self-report scale measures state paranoid and depression-like responses. 
Respondents rate the applicability of items relating to the degree to which they 
experienced a series of ten depressive and seven paranoid-like responses during an 
experiment on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = ‘not at all’, 6 = ‘very often’). Each factor of the 
scale has good internal consistency (α = .87 and α =.79) and discriminant validity and was 
highly related to other measures of paranoia. Higher scores reflect more depressive and 
paranoid-like states. The scale was also adapted as a pre-experiment measure, asking 
respondents to rate their paranoid and depression-like responses to tasks over the past 
week. 
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State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg 
 
& Jacobs, 1983). This 40-item widely-used self-report questionnaire measures state and 
trait anxiety. Respondents rate the applicability of state items on a 4-point Likert Scale 
(‘not at all’ to ‘very much so’) and the applicability of trait items on a 4-point Likert 
Scale (‘almost never’ to ‘almost always’). Scores on both scales range from 20-80, taking 
into account reversed items, with higher scores indicating greater anxiety. Both subscales 
have demonstrated high internal consistency (male State α = .91 and Trait α = .90 and 
(female State α = .93 and Trait α = .91) and test-retest reliability and good construct and 
concurrent validity (Spielberger et al., 1983). Normative scores for college student 
populations are as follows: For State anxiety, males M = 36.47 (SD=10.02) and females 
M = 38.76 (SD = 11.95). For Trait anxiety, males M = 38.3 (SD = 9.18) and females M = 
40.4 (SD = 10.15). 
 
 
 
 
Situational Self-Awareness Scale (SSAS; Govern & Marsch, 2001). 
 
This 9-item self-report questionnaire measures three domains of state self-focussed 
attention; private (3 items), public (3 items) and awareness of surroundings (3 items). 
Public self-focussed attention refers to features of oneself that are presented to others (for 
example physical features) and private self-focussed attention refers to attentiveness to 
the internal personal aspects of oneself (for example pain or memories). Respondents rate 
the applicability of items on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = ‘strongly disagree’ to 7 ‘strongly 
agree’). It has a reliable factor structure and acceptable internal consistency (public α = 
.82; private α = .70 and surroundings α = .72). Differences in self-awareness can also be 
produced by manipulating laboratory conditions. Normative scores for the subscales have 
been reported as follows; public (M = 12.38, SD = 4.77), private (M = 14.12, SD = 4.05 
and surroundings (M = 14.13, SD = 3.57). 
 
 
 
86 METACOGNITION AND THE POSITIVE SYMPTOMS OF PSYCHOSIS 
 
 
Experiences Questionnaire (EQ; Fresco et al., 2007). This 20-item self-report 
questionnaire measures decentring, the ability to define one’s thoughts and feelings as 
temporary. There are 14 items measuring decentring and 6 items measuring rumination. 
Scores are summed for a total score. Rumination is included to check that respondents 
who score high on decentring are in fact decentring and not responding with 
acquiescence. Items are endorsed on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = never; 5 = all the time). 
The scale correlates positively and significantly with cognitive re- appraisal and 
negatively and significantly with depressive rumination, experiential avoidance and 
emotion suppression (Fresco et al. 2007). Participants with major depression also scored 
significantly lower on levels of decentring than non-clinical participants. 
 
 
 
Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ-13; Gillanders et al., 2010). This 13- 
item self-report questionnaire measures cognitive fusion, the extent to which individuals 
become enmeshed with their thoughts. Scores are summed for a total score, taking into 
account reversed items. The CFQ-13 is a recently developed measure. Initial research 
suggests it has good internal consistency (α =.84 for total score, α =.88 for fusion items 
and α =.68 for defusion items). It also demonstrates good discriminant validity, 
distinguishing between individuals who do and do not have psychological disorder and 
correlates highly with measures of similar constructs, including psychological 
inflexibility and mindfulness. Therefore the CFQ-13 has demonstrated good internal 
consistency and discriminant validity. 
 
Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ; Wells & Davies, 1994). This 30-item 
self-report questionnaire measures the internal strategies used to control unwanted 
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thoughts. Respondents rate the applicability of items on a 4-point Likert scale (1=‘never’ 
to 4=‘almost always’). The items consist of five subscales (distraction, social control, 
worry, punishment and re-appraisal) each of which have good internal consistency; 
distraction (α = .72; social α = .79, worry α = .71; punishment α = .64; re-appraisal α = 
.67. The scale also correlates with similar measures. Subscale and a total score can be 
calculated by summing scores, taking into account reversed items. In a non-clinical 
sample (N=251), the total mean scores for males and females respectively were 49.22 
(SD = 7.27) and 48.29 (SD = 6.21). 
 
 
 
White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). This 
 
15-item self-report scale measures suppression of unwanted thoughts. Respondents rate 
the applicability of items on a 5-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree; 5= strongly 
agree). Scores are summed and range between 15 and 75, with higher scores indicating 
greater suppression. It has demonstrated good internal consistency (α = .89) and 
concurrent validity (Muris, Merckelbach & Horselenberg, 1996). It correlates positively 
with measures of obsessional thinking, feelings of depression and correlates positively 
with trait anxiety. Research has also shown that thought suppression is positively 
associated with the use of most thought control strategies measured by the TCQ (Wells & 
Davies, 1994). 
 
 
 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II; Hayes et al., 2004). This 7- 
item self-report questionnaire measures experiential avoidance - the ability to take action, 
the presence of worry, anxiety and negative evaluations and attempts to control or 
eliminate them. Respondents rate the applicability of items on a 7-point Likert scale. (1= 
‘never true’, 7=’always true’). The scale has good concurrent validity and test-retest 
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reliability (.64). The AAQ-II correlates significantly but not strongly with the WBSI and 
the TCQ, suggesting that the AAQ-II goes further than the measurement of thought 
suppression and attempts to control solely intrusive thoughts. It measures control of other 
private events such as bodily sensations. It correlates significantly (moderate to high) 
with measures of general psychopathology (including depression measured by the Beck 
 
Depression Inventory). 
 
 
 
 
Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). This 
 
22-item self-report questionnaire measures how often individuals engage in ruminative 
responses to feeling depressed. It includes three subscales; reflection, brooding and 
depression-related. Items are rated on a 4-point Likert Scale (1 = ‘never’ to 4 = ‘always’). 
Items are summed for a total score. The scale has demonstrated good internal consistency 
(α = .90), test re-test reliability (.67) and acceptable convergent and predictable validity 
(Treynor, Gonzalez & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). 
 
 
 
Supplementary state questions. The experimenter devised 7 independent Likert 
questions for use as a state indicator of the main concepts of the questionnaires detailed 
above. For example, the question ‘During the task how able were you to separate from 
your thoughts and feelings’ was designed to measure the presence of cognitive fusion 
during the task. The first item was reversed scored. 
 
 
 
 
Procedure 
 
 
 
 
The study included two phases. Informed consent based on details provided in the 
 
Participant Information Sheet (Appendix D) was gained from all participants. Phase one 
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included the screening of potential participants through completion of the PS (Fenigstein 
 
& Vanable, 1992) on an online university webpage. Individuals who fell above and below 
the high and low respective paranoia cut-offs and who had consented to being contacted 
were invited to participate in the experimental phase of the study (phase two). 
Phase two took place in a laboratory. Participants were asked to re-complete the 
PS (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) to verify the high and low paranoia groups. If still 
eligible, participants completed the PDS (Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998), STAI 
(Spielberger et al., 1998), SSAS (Govern & Marsch, 2001) and a demographics form. 
Participants were then randomly allocated using an internet randomizer programme
24 to 
the anxiety or control condition. 
Participants in the anxiety-inducing condition were given a computer task with 
three unsolvable concept formation problems with 10 trials in each (Bodner & 
Mikulincer, 1998; Ellett & Chadwick, 2007). Participants were asked to indicate which of 
the figures on the screen they believed was correct, (see Appendix E for an example). For 
each of the 10 trials, participants were told at random that they gave a correct (5 times) or 
incorrect response (5 times). When asked at the end of the 10 trials which value was 
correct, participants were always told they gave the incorrect answer and were presented 
with a false overall score of their performance (45%) compared to a list of 19 other false 
scores (ranging from 45% to 88%). To enhance the feeling of anxiety, the experimenter 
sat behind the participant (approximately two feet) with a neutral face watching them 
perform. A two-way mirror directly in front of participants meant that they could see 
themselves and the experimenter’s reflection. Participants also believed that they were 
being filmed and were able to see themselves and the experimenter in the monitor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 The randomiser program can be found at: www.randomizer.org 
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connected to the camera. The camera and mirror were not activated until the start of the 
computer task. 
The same unsolvable problems were given to participants in the control condition; 
however no false feedback on task performance was given. Participants were asked to 
provide a baseline of guesses (Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998). The two-way mirror and 
camera were not used and the experimenter did not sit behind them watching their 
performance. 
After completing the task, all participants in both conditions again completed the 
PDS (Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998), STAI (Spielberger et al., 1983) and SSAS (Govern & 
Marsch, 2001). Participants also completed metacognitive awareness measures including 
the EQ (Fresco et al., 2007) and CFQ-13 (Gillanders et al., 2010) and metacognitive 
strategy measures including the TCQ (Wells & Davies, 1994), WBSI (Wegner & 
Zanakos, 1994), AAQ-II (Hayes et al., 2004), RRS (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) 
and supplementary state questions.  All participants completed a short self-esteem task at 
the end of the study (Tamir, Robinson & Clore, 2002) to lift their mood (Appendix G). 
This task required participants to visualise and write about a happy event and rate their 
mood. 
Finally, participants were fully debriefed (Appendix H) and given the opportunity 
to ask questions. All participants received college credit or were paid. Phase two took 40- 
50 minutes per participant. 
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Results 
 
 
 
Data was analysed using the statistical package SPSS 19 for Windows. Data was 
tested for normality and homogeneity of variance. Several of the dependent variables 
were not normally distributed according to the Shapiro-Wilk test. Log and Square root 
transformations, based on positive skew of the data, were attempted. However, these 
transformations did not normalise the data with the exception of the Decentring subscale 
of the EQ (Fresco et al., 2007). Therefore the untransformed data was used in an Analysis 
of Variance (ANOVA) to examine the key hypotheses. Howell (1997) indicates that 
ANOVA is ‘a very robust statistical procedure’ (p. 321). In particular, ANOVA is 
unlikely to be significantly affected by violations of the normality assumption.  Appendix 
 
F reports Cronbach alphas of measures for the current study. 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
The mean Paranoia Scale score measures trait paranoia. There were no differences 
in trait paranoia between the experimental and control conditions in either the low 
paranoia groups, (experimental M = 28.20, SD = 2.86; control M = 27.35, SD = 3.82, 
t(38) = 0.79, p = .43) or in the high paranoia groups, (experimental M = 61.44, SD = 6.23; 
 
control M = 63.23, SD = 9.37, t(28) = 0.65, p = .52). 
 
There were no differences in age between the high and low paranoia groups in the 
experimental condition, (high M = 21.13, SD = 3.40; low M = 21.10, SD = 3.06, t(34) = 
0.02, p = .98). There were no significant differences between the high and low paranoia 
groups in the control condition, (high M = 20.06, SD = 1.98; low M = 20.90, SD = 3.26, 
t(35) = 0.93, p = .36. 
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Fisher’s Exact Test was used to determine gender differences of participants with 
high and low paranoia in the control condition, because cells had an expected count of 
less than five. In the control condition, there were no significant differences in gender, 
(Fisher’s Exact p = 0.25). In the experimental condition, there were also no significant 
differences in gender (Fisher’s Exact p = 1.00). 
A one-way univariate ANOVA was used to identify differences in trait anxiety. 
There was a significant main effect of paranoia level, F(1, 69) = 31.76, p = <.001, with 
participants high in paranoia displaying significantly higher trait anxiety before the 
experimental manipulation. See Table 4 for group means. 
 
 
 
 
Group Differences following Assignment to Condition 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
PDS means and standard deviations by group 
 
  High Paranoia 
 
Experimental 
High Paranoia 
 
Control 
Low Paranoia 
 
Experimental 
Low Paranoia 
 
Control 
PDS Paranoia Pre  22.19 (5.93)  25.12 (7.20)  12.2 (3.62)  11.4 (4.57) 
 
PDS Paranoia Post 
 
24.63 (5.69) 
 
26.88 (6.53) 
 
14.65 (5.25) 
 
10.8 (3.61) 
 
PDS Depression Pre 
 
38.25 (11.69) 
 
38.18 (8.38) 
 
24.45 (8.62) 
 
23.65 (7.71) 
 
PDS Depression Post 
 
39.13 (11.09) 
 
35.88 (12.7) 
 
23.30 (8.35) 
 
18.40 (6.63) 
Note. PDS = Paranoia and Depression Scale. 
 
 
 
 
Paranoid cognitions. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA with one within- 
subject factor (time pre and post manipulation) and two between-subjects factors 
(paranoia and condition) was conducted on PDS Paranoia scores (see Table 2 for group 
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means). There were significant main effects of time, F(1, 69) = 10.45, p = .002, and of 
paranoia, F(1, 69) = 113.63, p = <.001, but no effect of condition, F(1, 69) = .01, p = .91. 
These main effects were qualified by a significant paranoia by condition interaction, F(1, 
69) = 4.44, p = .04. A series of independent t-tests was used to explore this interaction. In 
the high paranoia group, there was no difference in the number of paranoid cognitions 
reported in the experimental or control conditions, t(31) = -1.23, p = .23. However, in the 
low paranoia group, there was a non-significant trend for participants in the experimental 
condition to report more paranoid cognitions than those in the control condition, t(38) = 
1.92, p = .06
25. 
 
There was also an interaction between time and condition that just missed 
significance, F(1, 69) = 3.95, p = .05. Given that this interaction was close to significance 
I explored it using paired-samples t-tests. In the experimental condition, there was a 
significant difference in number of reported paranoid cognitions over time, t(35) = -4.28, 
p = <.001, with participants in the experimental condition reporting more paranoid 
cognitions after the anxiety task. In the control condition, there was no significant 
difference, t(36) = -0.66, p = .52. 
 
 
 
Depressive cognitions. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA with one within- 
subject factor (time pre and post manipulation) and two between-subject factors (level of 
paranoia and condition) was conducted on PDS Depression scores (see Table 2 for 
means). There was no main effect of time, F(1, 69) = 3.49, p = .07, or condition, F(1, 69) 
= 1.32, p = .25; however, there was a significant main effect of paranoia level, F(1, 69) = 
61.83, p = <.001, with participants with high paranoia reporting significantly more 
depressive cognitions than participants with low paranoia. 
 
 
25 Bonferroni corrected p-values were used to counteract the use of multiple comparisons. Corrected p- 
value therefore was 0.025. 
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Table 3 
 
SSAS means and standard deviations by group 
 
  High 
 
Paranoia 
 
Experimental 
High 
 
Paranoia 
 
Control 
Low 
 
Paranoia 
 
Experimental 
Low 
 
Paranoia 
 
Control 
SSAS Surroundings Pre  12.00 (3.65)  14.06 (3.49)  13.60 (3.78)  12.75 (3.14) 
 
SSAS Surroundings 
 
12.13 (4.06) 
 
15.24 (4.02) 
 
13.20 (3.74) 
 
13.25 (2.95) 
 
Post         
 
SSAS Private Pre 
 
12.31 (4.40) 
 
13.64 (4.73) 
 
10.35 (4.15) 
 
10.60 (4.22) 
 
SSAS Private Post 
 
13.19 (3.15) 
 
14.00 (5.37) 
 
11.10 (4.23) 
 
11.70 (4.01) 
 
SSAS Public Pre 
 
13.75 (3.04) 
 
15.29 (4.07) 
 
11.00 (4.54) 
 
9.25 (4.57) 
 
SSAS Public Post 
 
13.5 (2.22) 
 
15.41 (4.68) 
 
10.75 (4.45) 
 
9.05 (4.31) 
Note. SSAS = situational self-awareness scale. 
 
 
 
 
A two-way between-subject multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
performed to investigate the hypothesis that participants high in paranoia when under 
threat would show higher levels of self-awareness. See Table 3 for group means. A 
MANOVA on the SSAS showed a significant overall effect of paranoia, F(6, 64) = 6.46, 
p = <.001, but no other overall effects were significant. 
 
 
 
Private self-awareness. There was a significant main effect of paranoia, F(1, 69) 
 
= 6.48, p = .01, in which participants with high paranoia displayed greater attention to 
their inner experience than participants with low paranoia. There was no main effect of 
time, F(1, 69) = 3.32, p = .73, and no interactions between time and paranoia level, F(1, 
69) = .14, p = .71, or between time and condition, F(1, 69) = 0.01, p = .92. In addition, 
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there was no main effect of condition, F(1, 69) = 0.66, p = 0.42, and no interaction 
between paranoia and condition, F(1, 69) = 0.12, p = .73. 
 
 
 
Public self-awareness. Similar to private self-awareness, there was a significant 
main effect of paranoia, F(1, 69) = 23.41, p = <.001, in which participants with high 
paranoia displayed greater attention to aspects of the self presented to others than 
participants with low paranoia. There was no main effect of time, F(1, 69) = .25, p = .62 
or condition, F(1, 69) = .00, p = .99) and no interactions between time and paranoia level, 
F(1, 69) = .07, p = .79, or between time and condition, F(1, 69) = .13, p = .72. The 
interaction between paranoia level and condition missed significance, F(1, 69) = 3.48, p = 
 
.07. 
 
 
 
 
Surroundings. There was no main effect of time, F(1, 69) = 1.20, p = .29, and no 
interactions between time and paranoia level, F(1, 69) = 0.88, p = .35, or between time 
and condition, F(1, 69) = 2.32, p = .13. There were no main effects of paranoia, F(1, 69) 
= .04, p = .84, or of condition, F(1, 69) = 2.01, p = 0.16. However, the interaction 
 
between paranoia level and condition just missed significance, F(1, 69) = 3.75, p = .06. A 
series of independent t-tests was used to explore this near-significant interaction. For the 
high paranoia groups there was a significant difference between SSAS Surroundings 
scores in the experimental and control groups, t(31) = 0.41, p = 0.04, but no differences in 
the low paranoia group (p = .68). Participants with high paranoia in the control group 
showed significantly more focus on surroundings than participants with high paranoia in 
the experimental group. No other post-hoc comparisons were significant. 
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Table 4 
 
STAI means and standard deviations by group 
 
  High Paranoia 
 
Experimental 
High Paranoia 
 
Control 
Low Paranoia 
 
Experimental 
Low Paranoia 
 
Control 
STAI-State Pre  45.31 (11.53)  45.06 (12.35)  33.05 (8.08)  33.05 (9.23) 
 
STAI-State Post 
 
51.00 (9.03) 
 
52.29 (13.31) 
 
37.40 (11.27) 
 
34.50 (8.92) 
 
STAI-Trait Pre 
 
58.38 (7.62) 
 
59.41 (10.93) 
 
49.40 (10.75) 
 
43.75 (7.18) 
Note. STAI = State-trait anxiety inventory. 
 
 
 
 
State anxiety. A two-way univariate ANOVA was used to determine differences 
in state anxiety scores (see Table 4 for group means).  There was a significant main effect 
of time, F(1, 69) = 29.91, p = <.001 and a significant main effect of paranoia, F(1, 69) = 
35.91, p <.05. This was qualified by a significant paranoia by time interaction, F(1, 69) = 
 
4.33, p = .04. A series of paired t-tests was used to explore this interaction. There was a 
significant difference between STAI-S scores of participants with low paranoia across 
time, t(39) = -2.30, p = .03, with anxiety increasing from pre-task to post-task. This 
indicates a trend, just missing significance at the bonferroni corrected p-value (p = 0.025). 
There was also a significant difference between STAI-S scores of participants with high 
paranoia across time, t(32) = 5.91, p = <.001, with anxiety increasing from pre-task to 
post-task. Over time, participants high in paranoia reported more state anxiety than 
participants low in paranoia, t(71) = 6.07, p = <.001. 
However, there was no main effect of condition, F(1, 69) = .04, p =.84 and no 
paranoia x condition interaction, F(1, 69) = .18, p = .67. Therefore, although state anxiety 
was significantly higher in both high paranoia groups, participation in the anxiety 
condition did not significantly increase state anxiety when compared to the other groups. 
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Table 5 
 
TCQ, WBSI, AAQ-II and RRS means and standard deviations by group 
 
  High Paranoia 
 
Experimental 
High 
 
Paranoia 
 
Control 
Low Paranoia 
 
Experimental 
Low 
 
Paranoia 
 
Control 
TCQ Distraction  15.06 (2.99)  14.94 (4.29)  15.40 (2.80)  15.05 (2.36) 
 
TCQ Punishment 
 
11.31 (2.41) 
 
11.05 (2.84) 
 
8.85 (2.11) 
 
8.40 (1.39) 
 
TCQ Reappraisal 
 
14.25 (3.13) 
 
15.00 (4.64) 
 
13.75 (3.51) 
 
14.30 (4.01) 
 
TCQ Worry 
 
10.88 (4.43) 
 
12.06 (4.32) 
 
8.10 (1.77) 
 
9.25 (2.67) 
 
TCQ Social 
 
12.25 (3.45) 
 
13.47 (6.04) 
 
14.50 (4.58) 
 
15.65 (6.94) 
 
Control         
 
WBSI 
 
55.44 (8.02) 
 
60.65 (7.21) 
 
47.15 (10.63) 
 
42.40 (10.56) 
 
AAQ-II 
 
25.69 (10.85) 
 
33.94 (10.66) 
 
16.05 (7.01) 
 
14.30 (5.31) 
 
RRS Brooding 
 
12.19 (2.74) 
 
14.47 (3.48) 
 
9.40 (2.99) 
 
9.20 (2.50) 
 
RRS Reflection 
 
11.50 (4.52) 
 
12.76 (4.67) 
 
10.45 (3.85) 
 
9.90 (2.97) 
 
RRS Depression 
 
31.06 (7.13) 
 
34.29 (7.80) 
 
22.55 (6.02) 
 
23.45 (5.61) 
 
RRS Total 
 
54.75 (11.95) 
 
61.53 (13.50) 
 
42.40 (10.85) 
 
42.55 (8.99) 
Note. TCQ = Thought Control Questionnaire; WBSI = White Bear Suppression 
 
Inventory; AAQ-II = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire; RRS = Ruminative 
 
Responses Questionnaire. 
 
 
 
 
Thought control. A two-way between-group MANOVA was performed to 
investigate whether participants high in paranoia in the anxiety condition would use the 
most maladaptive thought control strategies. The independent variables were level of 
paranoia and condition and the dependent variables were subscales of the thought control 
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questionnaire. See Table 5 for group means. A MANOVA on the TCQ showed a 
significant overall effect of paranoia level, F(5, 65) = 6.58, p = <.001, but not overall 
effect of condition, F(5, 65) = .88, p = .50 or interaction between paranoia and condition, 
F(5, 65) = .01, p = 1.00. 
There was a significant main effect of paranoia for some subscales, with 
participants high in paranoia scoring significantly higher on two of the thought control 
strategies, punishment, F(1, 69) = 24.21, p = <.001, and worry, F(1, 69) = 12.33, p = 
.001. There was a trend for participants in the high paranoia group to have lower scores 
on social control, F(1, 69) = 2.95, p = .09, which indicated that participants low in 
paranoia used more social control strategies. There were no main effects of paranoia for 
distraction, F(1, 69) = 0.08, p = .78, or reappraisal, F(1, 69) = 0.44, p = .51. There were 
no main effects of condition and no interactions (lowest p = .15). 
 
 
 
Thought suppression. A two-way univariate ANOVA was used to determine 
significant differences in thought suppression across paranoia level and condition (see 
Table 5 for group means). There was a significant main effect of paranoia, F(1, 69) = 
36.23, p = <.001, but not of condition, F(1, 69) = 0.01, p = .92. However, there was an 
interaction between paranoia and condition, F(1, 69) = 5.10, p = .03, depicted by Figure 
2. When participants with high paranoia were compared on levels of thought suppression 
across conditions, those in the control condition reported more thought suppression, 
which just missed significance, t(31) = -1.97, p = .06. Participants with low paranoia in 
both conditions did not differ in reported levels of thought suppression, t(38) = 1.42, p = 
.16. 
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Figure 2. Interaction between paranoia and condition on the WBSI. 
 
 
 
 
Rumination. A two-way between-group MANOVA was performed to investigate 
the hypothesis that participants high in paranoia when under threat would use the most 
ruminative strategies (see Table 5 for group means). A MANOVA on the RRS showed a 
significant overall effect of paranoia level, F(3, 67) = 14.61, p = <.001, but no overall 
effect of condition, F(3, 67) = .84, p = .47 or interaction between paranoia and condition, 
F(3, 67) = 1.21, p = .31. 
There was a significant main effect of paranoia for all three subscales of brooding, 
 
F(1, 69) = 33.93, p = <.001; depression, F(1, 69) = 38.62, p = <.001, and reflection, F(1, 
 
69) = 4.33, p =.04, with participants high in paranoia reporting more ruminative 
strategies. However, there was no main effect of condition on any of the three subscales 
(lowest  p = .14). There were no interactions between paranoia and condition for any of 
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the subscales, although there was a non-significant trend for brooding, F (1, 69), = 3.22, p 
 
= .07, but not for depression or reflection (lowest p = .34). 
 
A two-way univariate ANOVA was used to determine differences on the RRS 
 
total score. There was a significant main effect of paranoia level, F(1, 69) = 34.67, p = 
 
<.001, with participants high in paranoia reporting more ruminative strategies. There was 
no main effect of condition, F(1, 69) = 1.69, p = 0.19, and no interaction between 
paranoia level and condition, F(1, 69) = 1.55, p = 0.22. 
 
 
 
Psychological inflexibility. A two-way univariate ANOVA was used to 
determine differences across paranoia level and condition on levels of psychological 
inflexibility (see Table 5 for group means). There was a significant main effect of 
paranoia level, F(1, 69) = 52.80, p = <.001, but no main effect of condition, F(1, 69) = 
2.61, p =.11.  There was a significant interaction between paranoia level and condition, 
F(1, 69) = 6.16, p = .02  (see Figure 3). A series of independent samples t-tests was used 
to explore this interaction. Participants with high paranoia in the control condition 
reported more psychological inflexibility than participants with high paranoia in the 
experimental condition, t(31) = -2.20, p = .04. This indicates a non-significant trend at the 
Bonferroni corrected p-value of 0.025. No significant difference was found on levels of 
psychological inflexibility between participants with low paranoia in the experimental 
and control condition, t(38) = 0.89, p = .38. 
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Figure 3. Interaction between paranoia and condition on the AAQ. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
 
CFQ and EQ means and standard deviations by group 
 
  High Paranoia 
 
Experimental 
High Paranoia 
 
Control 
Low Paranoia 
 
Experimental 
Low Paranoia 
 
Control 
CFQ Total  53.81 (13.19)  61.76 (14.73)  41.30 (10.81)  40.50 (9.54) 
 
EQ Decentring 
 
32.56 (7.97) 
 
30.06 (7.96) 
 
35.20 (6.37) 
 
34.85 (4.90) 
 
EQ Total 
 
63.19 (10.19) 
 
62.18 (11.29) 
 
63.90 (8.33) 
 
62.90 (6.81) 
Note. CFQ = Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire; EQ = Experiences Questionnaire. Log 
 
Transformed means are not reported here to allow for comparison. 
 
 
 
 
Cognitive fusion. A two-way univariate ANOVA was used to determine whether 
 
participants with high paranoia in the experimental condition experienced greater 
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cognitive fusion (see Table 6 for group means). There was a significant main effect of 
paranoia, F(1, 69) = 35.45, p = <.001, in which participants with high paranoia reported 
higher levels of cognitive fusion. There was no main effect of condition, F(1, 69) = 1.59, 
p = .21, and no interaction between paranoia level and condition on cognitive fusion, F(1, 
 
69) = 2.38, p = .13. 
 
 
 
 
Decentring. Two-way univariate ANOVAs were used to determine whether 
participants high in paranoia in the experimental condition were less able to decentre, or 
to define one’s thoughts as temporary (see Table 6 for group means). For the EQ total 
score, there was no main effect of paranoia level, F(1, 69) = 0.11, p = .74 or condition, 
F(1, 69) = 0.22, p = .64. Similarly, there was no main effect found for level of paranoia 
on the decentring subscale, F(1, 69) = 0.09, p = .76 or condition, F(1, 69) = 1.49, p = .23. 
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Table 7 
 
Supplementary state questionnaire means and standard deviations by group 
 
  High 
 
Paranoia 
 
Experimental 
High 
 
Paranoia 
 
Control 
Low 
 
Paranoia 
 
Experimental 
Low 
 
Paranoia 
 
Control 
Ability to separate from  3.06 (1.06)  3.24 (0.97)  4.00 (0.79)  3.50 (1.10) 
 
thoughts and feelings         
 
Getting caught up in thoughts 
 
3.63 (0.96) 
 
3.47 (1.18) 
 
2.70 (0.98) 
 
2.55 (1.19) 
 
Attempts to push thoughts 
 
3.38 (1.20) 
 
3.71 (1.10) 
 
2.30 (1.29) 
 
2.78 (1.40) 
 
away 
 
2.75 (1.39) 
 
2.76 (1.44) 
 
1.90 (1.12) 
 
1.80 (1.32) 
 
Thinking about unwanted         
 
thoughts 
 
4.06 (1.12) 
 
3.41 (1.42) 
 
2.70 (1.26) 
 
2.15 (1.18) 
 
Negatively evaluating self as         
 
fact 
 
3.81 (0.98) 
 
3.41 (1.42) 
 
2.65 (1.18) 
 
2.65 (1.39) 
 
Anxiety 
 
4.69 (0.79) 
 
4.41 (1.06) 
 
3.85 (0.93) 
 
3.50 (1.36) 
 
Thinking about performance         
Note. There is only one item per subscale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary state questionnaire. A two-way between-group MANOVA was 
performed (see Table 7 for group means). A MANOVA on the supplementary questions 
showed a significant overall effect of paranoia level, F(7, 63) = 4.09, p = <.001, but no 
overall effect of condition, F(7, 63) = 1.34, p = .26 or interaction between paranoia and 
condition, F(7, 63) = .78, p = .60. 
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There was a significant main effect of paranoia for five of six subscales; ‘ability 
to separate thoughts and feelings’, F(1, 69) = 6.73, p = .01; ‘caught up in thoughts’, F(1, 
69) = 13.09, p = .001; ‘pushing thoughts away’, F(1, 69) = 16.22, p = <.001; ‘thinking 
about unwanted thoughts’, F(1, 69) = 8.62, p = .01; ‘negatively evaluating the self and 
seeing this as fact’; F(1, 69) = 19.92, p = <.001 and ‘anxiety’, F(1, 69) = 10.53, p = .002. 
There was no main effect of paranoia for ‘thinking about performance’, F(1, 69) = 0.02, p 
= .88. The only significant main effect of condition related to ‘negatively evaluating the 
self and seeing this as fact’, F(1, 69) = 4.17, p = .05. An independent t-test was used to 
explore this effect. However, there was no significant difference between conditions, 
t(71) = 1.76, p = .08. There was a trend for participants in the experimental condition to 
report more negative evaluations. No interactions were identified between paranoia level 
and condition. 
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Discussion 
 
 
 
A 2x2 between-subject design was employed to investigate whether metacognitive 
factors maintain distress in non-clinical paranoia. As hypothesised, participants with high 
paranoia reported more paranoid and depressive cognitions, state and trait anxiety, public 
and private self-focus, thought control, suppression, rumination, psychological 
inflexibility and cognitive fusion. However, the anxiety-induction task failed to 
significantly increase these variables. 
Participants with high paranoia reported significantly more paranoid cognitions 
than participants with low paranoia. However, the anxiety-induction task failed to 
significantly increase the frequency of paranoid cognitions reported by participants with 
high paranoia. Despite not reaching significance, the anxiety task was somewhat 
effective at inducing paranoid cognitions for participants with low paranoia. Participants 
in the anxiety condition reported more paranoid cognitions than in the control condition. 
The anxiety-induction task may have failed to increase paranoid cognitions in 
participants with high paranoia for several reasons. Participants with high paranoia may 
have interpreted the control task as ambiguous and therefore equally as ‘threatening’ as 
the anxiety task. This hypothesis fits with experimental studies that suggest higher levels 
of state paranoia are significantly related to negative interpretations of ambiguous events 
(Freeman et al., 2012). Further, clinical groups of patients with persecutory delusions 
require a need for order, desire for predictability and intolerance of ambiguity (McKay, 
Langdon & Coltheart, 2007). However, the number of reported paranoid cognitions only 
increased slightly in both high paranoia groups. The PDS (Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998) 
was adapted as a pre-task measure to identify increases in frequency of paranoid-like 
responses during the tasks. This may have contributed to lack of effects because it had not 
 
been validated and has unknown test re-test reliability. 
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Participants with high paranoia reported significantly more depressive cognitions 
than participants with low paranoia, but this was irrespective of condition. This suggests 
that the anxiety task did not increase levels of depression significantly in participants with 
high paranoia compared to participants with low paranoia, akin to the findings of Flower 
(2010). 
As hypothesised, participants with high paranoia reported higher levels of public 
and private self-awareness, referring to how individuals present themselves to others and 
paying attention to inner experiences including physical feelings of pleasure or pain 
(Govern & Marsch, 2001). The hypothesis that self-awareness would be increased by the 
anxiety task in participants with high paranoia was not found. 
These findings are partly supported by research that has found a positive 
correlation between state paranoia and public and private self-consciousness (Freeman et 
al., 2012). However, being watched, filmed and looking into a mirror did not significantly 
increase public and private self-awareness. Several other studies have found different 
results with participants without paranoia (Govern & Marsch, 2001) and with paranoia 
(Fenigstein, 1984; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). In addition, Flower (2010) found no 
significant differences between high and low paranoia groups in the ‘threat’ condition on 
self-focussed attention. 
Before randomisation to condition, participants with high paranoia reported 
significantly higher trait anxiety than participants with low paranoia, akin to Flower 
(2010). This finding provides support for current psychological models that highlight the 
central role of anxiety in the predisposition towards clinical (Freeman et al., 2002) and 
non-clinical paranoia (Freeman, 2007). All groups became more anxious over time, and 
participants with high paranoia became significantly more anxious over time compared to 
participants with low paranoia. However the anxiety-induction did not further increase 
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levels of anxiety above that in the control condition, which contrasts with the findings of 
 
Lincoln et al. (2010). 
 
As hypothesised, participants with high paranoia used significantly more thought 
control, (punishment and worry) than participants with low paranoia. This finding has 
been evidenced in correlational studies of persecutory delusions (Morrison & Wells, 
2000) and non-clinical studies of paranoia (Flower, 2010; Newman-Taylor et al., 2009); 
although the latter study found that these strategies were related more strongly to the 
presence of anxiety. The finding that participants with high paranoia report more 
uncontrollability of thoughts and state anxiety supports the findings of Freeman and 
Garety (1999), who suggested that anxiety processes underlie paranoia. However, the 
internal consistency of the subscale ‘punishment’ in the current study was below 
sufficient (α = .55) and therefore must be interpreted with caution. 
As hypothesised, participants with high paranoia also reported significantly more 
thought suppression than participants with low paranoia. Participants with low paranoia 
responded as expected, with no increases in thought suppression across conditions. 
Furthermore in the anxiety condition participants with high paranoia reported 
significantly more thought suppression than participants with low paranoia. A similar 
pattern of results was found for the control condition. However, results were not quite as 
expected, with participants with high paranoia in the control condition reporting more 
thought suppression than participants with high paranoia in the anxiety condition. This 
finding may support the hypothesis of ambiguity; however to the author’s knowledge, the 
 
effect of ambiguity on use of metacognitive strategies has not been investigated. 
Participants with high paranoia also used significantly more ruminative strategies 
and reported higher psychological inflexibility, regardless of condition, than participants 
with low paranoia. Further, it was surprising that participants with high paranoia in the 
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control condition endorsed more psychological inflexibility than participants with high 
paranoia in the anxiety-induction condition. Again, this may suggest that the control task 
was perceived as more threatening or simply represents greater pre-existing psychological 
inflexibility in participants randomised to this condition.  These findings overall support 
the application of the S-REF model (Wells & Matthews, 1994) to paranoia, since the 
thought control strategies implicated in the CAS were endorsed significantly more by 
participants with high paranoia and fits with research demonstrating the positive 
correlations between these strategies (Hayes et al., 2004; Wells & Davies, 1994). 
As hypothesised, participants with high paranoia reported significantly more 
cognitive fusion than participants with low paranoia. This has not previously been 
demonstrated. However, participants with high paranoia in the anxiety-induction condition 
did not report significantly more fusion than those in the control condition. Participants did 
not differ across condition or paranoia level on decentring. The findings in relation to 
metacognitive awareness are mixed and warrant further exploration. The EQ (Fresco et al., 
2007) correlates negatively with experiential avoidance therefore it was expected that since 
there was a significant result for experiential avoidance, a similar finding for decentring 
would follow. However, these correlations were reported for depressed populations 
(Fresco et al., 2007). To the author’s knowledge, the EQ (Fresco et al., 2007) has not 
previously been used or validated with a paranoid population.  
A correlation matrix (Appendix I) examined the associations between the primary 
dependent variables. Of particular note were the strong positive correlations between the 
AAQ and CFQ (r = .887), the WBSI and CFQ (r = .738), and the PDS Paranoia with the 
AAQ (r = .753) and CFQ (r = .686). Since the CFQ correlated with a number of measures, 
this warrants further investigation. A seven-item state measure was devised to address the 
limitation of using trait measures of metacognitive strategies and awareness to 
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identify group differences. Participants with high paranoia scored higher on five of six 
subscales. There was a trend for participants with high paranoia in the experimental 
condition to report more negative evaluations of the self and seeing this as fact than 
participants with low paranoia. This however, must be interpreted with caution owing to 
lack of validation and only one item measuring each metacognitive construct. 
Overall, the current study provides further support for the role of specific 
psychological processes implicated in the development and maintenance of anxiety 
(metacognitive strategies) to non-clinical paranoia and preliminary evidence for the 
presence of low metacognitive awareness. The findings of the current study lend support 
to the application of the S-REF model (Wells & Matthews, 1994) in an understanding of 
non-clinical paranoia, with thought control, suppression, experiential avoidance and 
rumination all significantly higher in participants with high paranoia. What cannot be 
concluded is whether these phenomena are implicated in the maintenance of distress in 
paranoia, owing to the lack of effective increase in anxiety and paranoid cognitions 
following the anxiety-induction task above that found in the control task. 
 
 
 
Study Limitations 
 
 
 
There are several other limitations of note in this study. The study relied on trait 
measures of metacognitive strategies and awareness because of a lack of state versions. It 
cannot therefore be concluded that the higher levels of metacognitive strategies and lower 
metacognitive awareness were related directly to the experimental manipulation. Further, 
some researchers argue that mild social anxiety rather than paranoia was manipulated. 
However, the paranoia hierarchy (Freeman, 2007) is based upon social-evaluative 
concerns and the Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) used to screen appropriate 
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  participants is based upon clinical measures of paranoia. Other methodological limitations 
include the lack of blinding of experimenter to condition or to level of paranoia, in theory 
meaning that the experimenter could have introduced bias to the study. In addition, 
although the differences were not significant, use of randomization with a small sample 
size led to unequal cognitive fusion scores between the high paranoia groups, with higher 
scores in the control condition and unequal trait anxiety scores between the low paranoia 
groups, with higher scores in the experimental condition. 
 
 
 
Clinical Implications 
 
 
 
Research with non-clinical populations can inform understanding of clinical 
psychopathology. The findings of the current study suggest that metacognitive strategies 
and metacognitive awareness should be considered when developing a formulation of 
clinical paranoia. Morrison et al.’s (2011) metacognitive model of clinical paranoia that 
implicates both metacognitive beliefs and thought control as a strategy to manage the 
unpleasant emotions related to delusion content may be a useful framework. Although 
CBT has to some extent shown its value as an effective treatment for psychosis, it is 
‘limited to effecting change only within the peripheral features (consequence) of the 
disorder, such as distress and behavioural reactions’ (Tai & Turkington, 2009, p.867) and 
shows no clear advantage over other interventions (Freeman, 2011; Jones, Hacker, 
Cormac, Meaden & Irving, 2012). 
Therefore, the current study logically supports the integration of metacognitive 
therapy as an intervention for clinical paranoia. The growth of research that has shown an 
association between metacognition and psychosis has led to the development of 
metacognitive-based treatments for positive symptoms, although evidence is in its 
infancy. Metacognitive therapy, underpinned by the S-REF model (Wells & Matthews, 
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1994) focuses solely on the styles of thinking (rumination, worry) and strategies used 
(thought suppression and avoidance) in order to alter the way individuals experience their 
thoughts and altering maladaptive metacognitive beliefs. 
Metacognitive training for psychosis (MCT) is more closely underpinned by 
cognitive-behaviour therapy for psychosis (CBTp); addressing both cognitive biases and 
maladaptive behaviour that contributes towards distress; with the addition of raising 
awareness about the cognitive bias through exercises. One randomised controlled trial 
assigned 48 individuals with schizophrenia spectrum disorder to cognitive remediation or 
individual MCT (Moritz, Veckenstedt, Randjbar, Vitzthum & Woodward, 2011a). Over 
four weeks, delusion severity declined significantly more in the MCT group. However, 
other than addressing thought suppression and rumination it is unclear how different 
MCT is from CBTp.  In addition, the long-term gains of MCT were not analysed, with no 
follow-up and metacognition was not measured, hence the effects of symptom reduction 
cannot be attributed to metacognitive processes if this was not measured. Group-format 
MCT however has shown significant effects on intensity of distress rather than symptom 
reduction (Moritz et al., 2011b). 
A case study of an individual with schizophrenia highlighted a negative 
association between metacognitive capacity and awareness and delusions and lack of 
insight following psychotherapy (Lysaker, Buck & Ringer, 2007). Metacognitive training 
and therapy is therefore in its infancy compared to CBT, but experimental and 
correlational research demonstrating a link between metacognition and positive psychotic 
symptoms suggests further clinical randomised trials are required. 
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Future Research 
 
 
 
This experimental study demonstrated the differences in metacognitive strategies and 
awareness in participants with high and low levels of non-clinical paranoia. However, 
participants with high paranoia may have interpreted the control task not as neutral, but as 
ambiguous and therefore equally as ‘threatening’ as the anxiety task. This may explain 
the lack of condition effects. Other anxiety-inducing experimental manipulations, for 
example that of Lincoln et al. (2010) should be used to investigate the hypotheses of the 
current study. However, it would be useful to replicate this study with a clinical 
population and to examine the effects of ambiguity on metacognitive processes. For 
experimental manipulations of paranoia, the development of state metacognition 
questionnaires would be valuable to research in this area. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
In conclusion, this study provides support for the role of metacognitive strategies 
and awareness in the experience of non-clinical paranoia. Future studies must investigate 
whether the presence of distress increases the frequency of these metacognitive variables 
to demonstrate whether metacognition maintains distress in paranoia. In addition, future 
research should investigate whether identified and validated ambiguous situations lead to 
an increase in distress and metacognitive processes. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
Definitions of the MCQ-65 subscales (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) 
 
 
 
 
Subscale name  Definition 
Positive beliefs about worry (PB)  Worry helps planning and problem-solving 
Uncontrollability and danger (UD)  Worry must be controlled in order to 
 
remain safe and to function and includes 
beliefs about the uncontrollability of worry. 
Lack of cognitive confidence (CC)  Lack of confidence in one’s own memory 
 
and attentional ability. 
General negative beliefs (SPR)  The need to control thoughts in general and 
 
superstitious themes of personal 
responsibility arising from harmful 
consequences of not controlling thoughts. 
Cognitive self-consciousness (CSC)  Refers to cognitive self-awareness or 
 
preoccupation with one’s own thought 
 
processes. 
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Ethics Approval 
 
Submission Number: 1482 
Submission Name: The role of metacognition in the maintenance of distress in paranoia. 
This is email is to let you know your submission was approved by the Ethics Committee. 
 
You can begin your research unless you are still awaiting specific Health and Safety 
approval (e.g. for a Genetic or Biological Materials Risk Assessment) 
 
Comments 
1.BUT the Phase Two consent from needs a slight alteration - in the first bullet point it 
should read that they have read version 2 of the Information Sheet. 
 
 
 
Click here to view your submission 
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ERGO : Ethics and Research Governance Online 
http://www.ergo.soton.ac.uk 
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Paranoia Scale 
 
 
 
There are some statements below about certain feelings and beliefs that people usually 
have concerning themselves, others and certain situations. Your task is to choose how 
well each statement is applicable to you. 
 
  Not at all  Slightly  Somewhat  Applicable   Extremely 
applicable  applicable   applicable    applicable  applicable 
to me   to me    to me    to me     to me 
1. Someone has it in for me   
1  2  3  4  5 
2. I sometimes feel as if I’m being 
followed 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
3. I believe that I have often been 
punished without a cause 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
4. Some people have tried to 
steal my ideas and take credit for 
them 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
5. My parents and family find 
more fault with me than they 
should 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
6. No one really cares much what 
happens to you 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
7. I am sure I get a raw deal of 
life 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
8. Most people will use somewhat 
unfair means to gain profit or an 
advantage rather than lose it 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
9.I often wonder what hidden 
reasons another person may 
have for doing something nice for 
you 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
10. It is safer to trust no one   
1  2  3  4  5 
11. I have often felt that strangers 
were looking at me critically 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
12. Most people make friends 
because friends are likely to be 
useful to them 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
13. Someone has been trying to 
influence my mind 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
14. I am sure I have been talked 
about behind my back 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
15. Most people inwardly dislike 
putting themselves out to help 
other people 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
16. I tend to be on my guard with  1  2  3  4  5 
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people who are somewhat more 
friendly than I expect 
 
17. People have said insulting 
and unkind things about me 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
18. People often disappoint me   
1  2  3  4  5 
19. I am bothered by people 
outside, in cars, in stores etc 
watching me 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
20. I have often found people 
jealous of my good ideas just 
because they had not thought of 
them first 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(PS; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) 
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Paranoia and Depression Scale (PDS; Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998) 
 
Following the task you have just completed, please rate how true each statement is for 
you by circling a number next to it. 
 
1. I’m disappointed from my performance 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
 
Not at 
all 
Very 
often 
 
 
2. I feel that I do not have energy to perform other tasks 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
Not at 
all 
Very 
often 
 
 
3. I feel ashamed of my task performance 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
Not at 
all 
 
Very 
often 
 
 
4. I do not have the appropriate abilities to perform the tasks 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
Not at 
all 
 
Very 
often 
 
 
5. I have doubts about my abilities and skills 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
Not at 
all 
Very 
often 
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6. I’m critical of my task performance 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
Not at 
all 
 
Very 
often 
 
 
 
7. I feel guilty about my task performance 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
Not at 
all 
 
Very 
often 
 
 
8. I feel that I’m less competent than others 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
Not at 
all 
Very 
often 
 
 
 
9. I feel weak and tired 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
Not at 
all 
Very 
often 
 
 
10. I feel helpless 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
Not at 
all 
Very 
often 
 
 
11. I feel that my behaviour is being analysed 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
Not at 
all 
 
Very 
often 
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12. I feel that people talk about me 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
Not at 
all 
 
Very 
often 
 
 
13. I feel that people are hostile to me 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
Not at 
all 
 
Very 
often 
 
 
14. I feel that others are picking on me 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
Not at 
all 
Very 
often 
 
 
 
 
15. I feel that others are examining my actions 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
Not at 
all 
 
Very 
often 
 
 
16. I feel that others influence my performance 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
Not at 
all 
Very 
often 
 
 
 
 
17. I do not trust other people’s intentions 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
Not at 
all 
 
Very 
often 
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WBSI 
 
This survey is about thoughts. There are no right or wrong answers, so please respond 
honestly to each of the items below. Be sure to answer every item by circling the 
appropriate letter beside each. 
 
A  B  C  D  E 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral or Don't 
Know 
Agree  Strongly 
Agree 
 
1. There are things I prefer not to think about.  A B C D E 
2. Sometimes I wonder why I have the thoughts I do.  A B C D E 
3. I have thoughts that I cannot stop.  A B C D E 
4. There are images that come to mind that I cannot 
erase. 
A B C D E 
5. My thoughts frequently return to one idea.  A B C D E 
6. I wish I could stop thinking of certain things.  A B C D E 
7. Sometimes my mind races so fast I wish I could stop 
it. 
A B C D E 
8. I always try to put problems out of mind.  A B C D E 
9. There are thoughts that keep jumping into my head.  A B C D E 
10. There are things that I try not to think about.  A B C D E 
11. Sometimes I really wish I could stop thinking.  A B C D E 
12. I often do things to distract myself from my 
thoughts. 
A B C D E 
13. I have thoughts that I try to avoid.  A B C D E 
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14. There are many thoughts that I have that I don't tell 
anyone. 
A B C D E 
15. Sometimes I stay busy just to keep thoughts from 
intruding on my mind. 
A B C D E 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) 
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Thought Control Questionnaire 
 
Most people experience unpleasant and/or unwanted thoughts which can be difficult to 
control. We are interested in the techniques that you use to control such thoughts. Below 
are a number of things that people do to control these thoughts. Please read each 
statement carefully, and indicate how often you use each technique by circling the 
appropriate number. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time 
thinking about each one. 
When I experience an unpleasant/ unwanted thought: 
 
    Never  Sometimes  Often  Almost 
Always 
1  I call to mind positive images instead  1  2  3  4 
2  I tell myself not to be so stupid  1  2  3  4 
3  I focus on the thought  1  2  3  4 
4  I replace the thought with a more trivial 
bad thought 
1  2  3  4 
5  I don’t talk about the thought to anyone  1  2  3  4 
6  I punish myself for thinking the thought  1  2  3  4 
7  I dwell on other worries  1  2  3  4 
8  I keep the thought to myself  1  2  3  4 
9  I occupy myself with work instead  1  2  3  4 
10  I challenge the thought’s validity  1  2  3  4 
11  I get angry at myself for having the 
thought 
1  2  3  4 
12  I avoid discussing the thought  1  2  3  4 
13  I shout at myself for having the thought  1  2  3  4 
14  I analyse the thought rationally  1  2  3  4 
15  I slap or pinch myself to stop the thought  1  2  3  4 
16  I think pleasant thoughts instead  1  2  3  4 
17  I find out how my friends deal with these 
thoughts 
1  2  3  4 
18  I worry about more minor things instead  1  2  3  4 
19  I do something that I enjoy  1  2  3  4 
20  I try to interpret the thought  1  2  3  4 
21  I think about something else  1  2  3  4 
22  I think more about the minor problems I 
have 
1  2  3  4 
23  I try a different way of thinking about it  1  2  3  4 
24  I think about past worries instead  1  2  3  4 
25  I ask my friends if they have similar 
thoughts 
1  2  3  4 
26  I focus on different negative thoughts  1  2  3  4 
27  I question the reasons for having the 
thought 
1  2  3  4 
28  I tell myself that something bad will 
happen if I think the thought 
1  2  3  4 
29  I talk to a friend about the thought  1  2  3  4 
30  I keep myself busy  1  2  3  4 
(TCQ; Wells & Davies, 1994) 
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Ruminative Responses Scale 
People think and do many different things when they feel depressed. Please read each 
of the items below and indicate whether you almost never, sometimes, often or almost 
always think or do each one when you feel sad, down or depressed. Please indicate 
what you generally do, not what you think you should do. 
 
   
Almost 
never 
 
 
Sometimes 
 
 
Often 
 
Almost 
always 
1. Think about how alone you feel         
2. Think “I won’t be able to do my job if I 
don’t snap out of this” 
       
3. Think about your feelings of fatigue and 
achiness 
       
4. Think about how hard it is to 
concentrate 
       
5. Think “what am I doing to deserve this?”         
6. Think about how passive and 
unmotivated you feel 
       
7. Analyse recent events to try to 
understand why you are depressed 
       
8. Think about how you don’t seem to feel 
anything anymore 
       
9. Think “why can’t I get going?”         
10. Think “why do I always react this 
way?” 
       
11. Go away by yourself and think about 
why you feel this way 
       
12. Write down what you are thinking 
about and analyse it 
       
13. Think about a recent situation, wishing 
it had gone better 
       
14. Think “I won’t be able to concentrate if 
I keep feeling this way” 
       
15. Think “why do I have problems other 
people don’t have?” 
       
16. Think “why can’t I handle things 
better?” 
       
17. Think about how sad you feel         
18. Think about all your shortcomings, 
failings, faults, mistakes 
       
19. Think about how you don’t feel up to 
doing anything 
       
20. Analyse your personality to try to         
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understand why you are depressed         
21. Go someplace alone to think about 
your feelings 
       
22. Think about how angry you are with 
yourself 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) 
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AAQ-II 
 
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by circling a 
number next to it. Use the scale below to make your choice. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
never 
true 
very seldom 
true 
seldom 
true 
sometimes 
true 
frequently 
true 
almost 
always true 
always 
true 
 
 
 
1.  My painful experiences and memories make it difficult for me to live a 
life that I would value. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
2.  I’m afraid of my feelings.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
3.  I worry about not being able to control my worries and feelings.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
4.  My painful memories prevent me from having a fulfilling life.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
5.  Emotions cause problems in my life.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
6.  It seems like most people are handling their lives better than I am.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
7.  Worries get in the way of my success.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(AAQ-II; Hayes et al., 2004) 
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(CFQ; Gillanders et al., 2010) 
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(EQ; Fresco et al., 2007). 
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Supplementary state questions 
 
1. During the task, how able were you to separate from your thoughts and feelings? 
 
   _ 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
A lot  A little  Neither able 
nor unable 
 
Not really 
able 
 
Not at all 
able 
 
 
 
2. During the task, how much did you get caught up in your thoughts? 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Not at all  Not really  Neither  A little  A lot 
 
 
 
 
 
3. During the task, how much did you try to push thoughts out of your head? 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Not at all  Not really  Neither  A little  A lot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. During the task, how much were you thinking about things you didn’t want to? 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Not at all  Not really  Neither  A little  A lot 
 
 
 
 
 
5. During the task, how much did you negatively evaluate yourself and see this as fact? 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Not at all  Not really  Neither  A little  A lot 
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6. During the task, how anxious did you feel? 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
 
Not at all 
anxious 
Not really 
anxious 
Neutral  A little 
anxious 
Very anxious 
 
 
 
 
 
7. During the task, how much did you think about how well or badly you were performing? 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Not at all  Not really  Neither  A little  A lot 
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Appendix D 
 
Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form 
 
 
Study title: Thinking about Thinking 
 
Researcher: Catherine Seaman, Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
 
 
 
Please read this information sheet carefully before deciding to participate in this research. If 
you are happy to participate you will be asked to sign a consent form. 
 
What is the research about? 
I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist studying at the University of Southampton. As part of my 
training, I am conducting research examining the process of ‘thinking about thinking’ in 
university staff and students. This area of research is currently receiving much attention. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
A large number of people completed a questionnaire for phase one of this study on iSurvey. 
Following this, some people were selected to take part in the experimental second phase of the 
study. 
 
What will happen if I take part? 
This is an experimental study. You will be asked to complete some questionnaires before and 
after taking part in a computerised concept learning task. After this, you will be asked to complete 
a visualisation task. Your participation should take approximately fifty minutes in total. 
 
Are there any benefits in my taking part? 
If you choose to take part, you will be granted course credit. Your participation will also 
contribute towards knowledge in this area of psychology. 
 
Are there any risks involved? 
There are no risks involved.  You may experience some transient negative thoughts and feelings. 
After the study has finished, the research will be fully explained to you and you will be given the 
opportunity to ask questions. 
 
Will my participation be confidential? 
Any collected data will not include personal identifying characteristics and will be kept on a 
password protected computer. Only those involved in the study (myself and my two supervisors) 
will have access to the study data. 
 
What happens if I change my mind? 
Your participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw at any time. If you withdraw, 
this will not have any effect on your grade or your treatment as a student in the psychology 
department. 
 
What happens if something goes wrong? 
I have any questions about my rights as a participant in this research, or if I feel that I have been 
placed at risk, I may contact the chair of the Ethics Committee, Psychology, University of 
Southampton, SO17 1BJ, UK. Phone: +44 (0)23 8059 4663, email   slb1n10@soton.ac.uk 
 
Finally, if you require any further information, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
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CONSENT FORM (Version 2, 04.05.2012) 
Study title: Thinking about Thinking 
 
 
 
Please initial the box(es) if you agree with the statement(s): 
 
 
 
 
I have read and understood the information sheet (Version 2/04.05.2012) 
and have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study 
 
 
 
 
I agree to take part in this research project and agree for my data to 
be used for the purpose of this study 
 
 
 
I understand my participation is voluntary and I may withdraw 
at any time without penalty or loss of benefit to myself. 
 
 
 
I understand that my data collected will be treated confidentially 
and that published results of this research project will also retain 
my confidentiality. 
 
 
 
 
Name of participant (print name)…………………………………………………… 
Signature of participant…………………………………………………………….. 
Date………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix E 
 
Example item from computer task 
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Appendix F 
 
 
 
 
Cronbach alpha coefficients for the current study 
 
Cronbach Alpha 
coefficient pre task 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
coefficient 
post task 
 
PS  .96  / 
 
PDS Paranoia Pre  .91  .91 
 
PDS Depression Pre  .92  .94 
 
SSAS Private  .86  .86 
 
SSAS Public  .87  .88 
 
SSAS Surroundings  .76  .87 
 
STAI Trait  .88    / 
STAI State  .94  .95 
EQ Total  /  .81 
 
EQ Decentring  /  .84 
 
CFQ  /  .91 
 
TCQ Distraction  /  .64 
 
TCQ Punishment  /  .55 
 
TCQ Worry  /  .86 
 
TCQ Re-appraisal  /  .73 
 
TCQ Social Control  /  .76 
 
WBSI  /  .89 
 
AAQ  /  .96 
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RRS Depression  /  .90 
 
RRS Brooding 
 
/ 
 
.79 
 
RRS Reflection 
 
/ 
 
.85 
 
RRS Total 
 
/ 
 
.93 
Note. PS = Paranoia Scale; PDS = Paranoia and Depression Scale; SSAS = situational 
 
self-awareness scale; STAI = state trait anxiety inventory; EQ = experiences 
questionnaire; CFQ = cognitive fusion questionnaire; TCQ = thought control 
questionnaire; WBSI = white bear suppression inventory; AAQ = acceptance and action 
questionnaire; RRS = ruminative response questionnaire. 
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Appendix G 
 
Brief self-esteem task 
 
Please think about your own life. Try to think about an event that made you feel really happy in 
the past few years. Please take time to imagine what this event was like that made you feel truly 
happy and try to relive it again in your mind's eye. Then describe what made you feel happy as 
vividly and in as much detail as you can. 
 
You can write for up to ten minutes about this event below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How happy do you now feel having completed this exercise (please circle)? 
 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Very slightly 
happy 
Quite happy  Extremely happy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Tamir, Robinson & Clore, 2002) 
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Appendix H 
 
 
 
 
Debriefing statements for the anxiety and control conditions 
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Thinking about Thinking Study 
Debriefing Statement - Threat Group (Version 1, 04.05.2012) 
 
 
Brief paranoid thoughts or passing suspiciousness is experienced at some point by most 
people and is common in the general population. Examples of suspiciousness include 
thinking that other people are trying to irritate you or feeling like you are being watched. 
Passing suspicious thoughts can have a useful function. For example, if you think that 
someone might be following you when walking along a dark path, you may change your 
direction in order to feel more safe. This level of suspiciousness is not a sign of (mental 
health difficulties/a clinical problem). However, examining non-clinical levels of 
suspiciousness can inform our understanding of the phenomenon in clinical populations. 
Investigating low-level phenomena is a common method of research. People with low 
level anxiety or low mood are often recruited to studies in order to inform an 
understanding of emotional disorders. 
 
The overall aim of this study was to explore the role of meta-cognition in the 
maintenance of distress in non-clinical paranoia/suspiciousness. Meta-cognition can be 
described as thinking about thinking or the process of thinking. It involves making sense 
of thoughts (for example, ‘the fact I am having this thought means I can’t cope’) or 
controlling thoughts (for example attempting to push thoughts away). Understanding the 
process of thinking is gaining much attention in certain areas of research. Research 
suggests that meta-cognition plays a role in the maintenance of emotional disorders 
(anxiety and depression) and research also suggests a link between meta-cognition and 
paranoia/suspiciousness at a non-clinical and clinical level. 
 
The study involved completing some questionnaires before and after a computer task. 
The study assigned one half of all individuals recruited to participate in a threat activation 
task, which was designed to induce mild paranoia/suspiciousness. The other half of 
individuals were assigned to a neutral task which was not designed to induce 
paranoia/suspiciousness. The purpose of this was to test whether or not there is a 
relationship between meta-cognition and non-clinical suspiciousness. You were 
assigned to participate in the threat task. 
 
This study involved deception. Deception was necessary in order for the experimental 
manipulation to be effective. The task that you were asked to do on the computer 
could not be solved. In addition, you were not being observed. The two-way mirror 
was not used. 
 
It is expected that people who are more suspicious will be more likely to become stuck 
on thoughts (cognitive fusion), go over thoughts lots of times in an attempt to resolve a 
problem (rumination), try to control thoughts (thought control), try not to think about 
thoughts (thought suppression) and attempt to control worry, anxiety and being 
negatively evaluated. They may also see thoughts as fixed rather than temporary 
thoughts that pass through the mind. The questionnaires you were asked to complete 
measured these areas. 
 
The visualisation task at the end of the experiment was designed to restore your mood, 
in case you experienced any negative thoughts or feelings during the task. 
 
If you have any further concerns or questions, please do not hesitate to contact me or 
contact your GP for further advice. 
 
You may have a copy of this summary if you wish. Thank you very much for your 
participation in this study. 
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Brief paranoid thoughts or passing suspiciousness is experienced at some point by most 
people and is common in the general population. Examples of suspiciousness include 
thinking that other people are trying to irritate you or feeling like you are being watched. 
Passing suspicious thoughts can have a useful function. For example, if you think that 
someone might be following you when walking along a dark path, you may change your 
direction in order to feel more safe. This level of suspiciousness is not a sign of (mental 
health difficulties/a clinical problem). However, examining non-clinical levels of 
suspiciousness can inform our understanding of the phenomenon in clinical populations. 
Investigating low-level phenomena is a common method of research. People with low 
level anxiety or low mood are often recruited to studies in order to inform an 
understanding of emotional disorders. 
 
The overall aim of this study was to explore the role of meta-cognition in the 
maintenance of distress in non-clinical paranoia/suspiciousness. Meta-cognition can be 
described as thinking about thinking or the process of thinking. It involves making sense 
of thoughts (for example, ‘the fact I am having this thought means I can’t cope’) or 
controlling thoughts (for example attempting to push thoughts away). Understanding the 
process of thinking is gaining much attention in certain areas of research. Research 
suggests that meta-cognition plays a role in the maintenance of emotional disorders 
(anxiety and depression) and research also suggests a link between meta-cognition and 
paranoia/suspiciousness at a non-clinical and clinical level. 
 
The study involved completing some questionnaires before and after a computer task in 
which you were asked to solve problems. The study assigned one half of all individuals 
recruited to participate in a threat activation task, which was designed to induce mild 
paranoia/suspiciousness. The other half of individuals were assigned to a neutral task 
which was not designed to induce paranoia/suspiciousness. The purpose of this was to 
test whether or not there is a relationship between meta-cognition and non-clinical 
suspiciousness. You were assigned to participate in the neutral, non-threatening 
task. 
 
This study also involved deception. Deception was necessary in order for the 
experimental manipulation to be effective. The task that you were asked to do on the 
computer could not be solved. 
 
It is expected that people who are more suspicious will be more likely to become stuck 
on thoughts (cognitive fusion), go over thoughts lots of times in an attempt to resolve a 
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problem (rumination), try to control thoughts (thought control), try not to think about 
thoughts (thought suppression) and attempt to control worry, anxiety and being 
negatively evaluated. They may also see thoughts as fixed rather than temporary 
thoughts that pass through the mind. The questionnaires you were asked to complete 
measured these areas. 
 
The visualisation task at the end of the experiment was designed to restore your mood, 
in case you experienced any negative thoughts or feelings during the task. 
 
 
 
If you have any further concerns or questions, please do not hesitate to contact me, or 
contact your GP for further advice. 
 
You may have a copy of this summary if you wish. 
Thank you very much for your participation in this study. 
References for further reading on this topic: 
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Exploratory correlation matrix 
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